The philosophers

and pompous thinkers

step in the same puddles

on that road we all walk

~

its just that they do it

not by accident

but while trying not to

Nochrisis

Beyond good and evil, prelude to a philosophy of the future

By Friedrich Nietzsche

First chapter.

PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS.

5.

That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of “inspiration”); whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or ” suggestion,” which is generally their heart’s desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub ” truths,” —and very far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself; very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery* of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his” categorical imperative”—makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocuspocus of mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has as it were clad his philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the “love of his wisdom,” to translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene**:—how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray!

* hypocrisy

** ancient Greek goddess associated with wisdom, handicraft, and warfare

Translated by Helen Zimmerm

1909

In our life

truth is like a friend from a distant time

a memory we cherish

but one we don’t need

Nochrisis

Beyond good and evil, prelude to a philosophy of the future

By Friedrich Nietzsche

First chapter.

PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS.

4.

The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing; and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori* belong), are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions, with out a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live—that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. To recognize untruth as a condition of life : that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has: thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil.

Translated by Helen Zimmerm

1909

*

You see the world as evil

that can not bear your pride

~

your values come from there

but not this rock we’re on

~

the blindness of our thoughts

is the reason why you hate

Nochrisis

Beyond good and evil, prelude to a philosophy of the future

By Friedrich Nietzsche

First chapter.

PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS.

2.

” How could anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? Or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness ? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of their own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the “Thing-in-itself“—there must be their source, and nowhere else!”—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognised, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this “belief” of theirs, they exert themselves for their “knowledge,” for something that is in the end solemnly christened ” the Truth.” The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in antitheses of values. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, ” de omnibus dubitandum” For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all ; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—” frog perspectives,” as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretense, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps ! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous ” Perhapses ” ! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous ” Perhaps ” in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.

Translated by Helen Zimmerm

1909