Day 710, Leaving in Hades.

Day 710-1

Friedrich Nietzsche

Human all too human

374.

Leaving in Hades.—We must leave many things in the Hades of half-conscious feeling, and not try to release them from their shadow-existence, or else they will become, as thoughts and words, our demoniacal tyrants, with cruel lust after our blood.

Day 704, The Freezing-Point of the Will.

Day 704-1

Friedrich Nietzsche

Human all too human

349.

The Freezing-Point of the Will.—“Some time the hour will come at last, the hour that will envelop you in the golden cloud of painlessness; when the soul enjoys its own weariness and, happy in patient playing with patience, resembles the waves of a lake, which on a quiet summer day, in the reflection of a many-hued evening sky, sip and sip at the shore and again are hushed—without end, without purpose, without satiety, without need—all calm rejoicing in change, all ebb and flow of Nature’s pulse.” Such is the feeling and talk of all invalids, but if they attain that hour, a brief period of enjoyment is followed by ennui. But this is the thawing-wind of the frozen will, which awakes, stirs, and once more begets desire upon desire.—Desire is a sign of convalescence or recovery.

Day 696, Art makes the thinker’s heart heavy.

Day 696-1

The winter is not gone yet, the snow comes and goes but the ground is still frozen. Maybe 2 more moths ore a bit longer.

Friedrich Nietzsche

Human all too human

153
Art makes the thinker’s heart heavy. – How strong the metaphysical need is, and how hard nature makes it to bid it a final farewell, can be seen from the fact that even when the free spirit has divested himself of everything metaphysical the highest effects of art can easily set the metaphysical strings, which have long been silent or indeed snapped apart, vibrating in sympathy; so it can happen, for example, that a passage in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony will make him feel he is hovering above the earth in a dome of stars with the dream of immortality in his heart: all the stars seem to glitter around him and the earth seems to sink farther and farther away. – If he becomes aware of being in this condition he feels a profound stab in the heart and sighs for the man who will lead him back to his lost love, whether she be called religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments that his intellectual probity is put to the test.

Day 689, By the waterfall.

Day 689-1

Friedrich Nietzsche

Human all too human

106
By the waterfall. – At the sight of a waterfall we think we see in the countless curvings, twistings and breakings of the waves capriciousness and freedom of will; but everything here is necessary, every motion mathematically calculable. So it is too in the case of human actions; if one were all-knowing, one would be able to calculate every individual action, likewise every advance in knowledge, every error, every piece of wickedness. The actor himself, to be sure, is fixed in the illusion of free will; if for one moment the wheel of the world were to stand still, and there were an all-knowing, calculating intelligence there to make use of this pause, it could narrate the future of every creature to the remotest ages and describe every track along which this wheel had yet to roll. The actor’s deception regarding himself, the assumption of free-will, is itself part of the mechanism it would have to compute.

Human all too human: 47. Hypochondria.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Sick for Christ.

DSCF8666

There are people who become hypochondriacal through their sympathy and concern for another person; the kind of sympathy which results therefrom is nothing but a disease. Thus, there is also a Christian hypochondria, which afflicts those solitary, religiously-minded people who keep constantly before their eyes the sufferings and death of Christ.


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

There are people who become hypochondriacal through their sympathy and concern for another person ; the kind of sympathy which results therefrom is nothing but a disease. Thus there is also a Christian hypochondria, which afflicts those solitary, religiously-minded people who keep constantly before their eyes the sufferings and death of Christ.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. HYPOCHONDRIA.—There are people who become hypochondriacal through their sympathy and concern for another person ; the kind of sympathy which results therefrom is nothing but a disease. Thus there is also a Christian hypochondria, which afflicts those solitary, religiously-minded people who keep constantly before their eyes the sufferings and death of Christ.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Hypochondrie.- Es giebt Menschen, welche aus Mitgefühl und Sorge für eine andere Person hypochondrisch werden; die dabei entstehende Art des Mitleidens ist nichts Anderes, als eine Krankheit. So giebt es auch eine christliche Hypochondrie, welche jene einsamen, religiös bewegten Leute befällt, die sich das Leiden und Sterben Christi fortwährend vor Augen stellen.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 46. Sympathy stronger than suffering.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Your shame, my suffering.

DSCF8619-Edit

Sympathy can be stronger than suffering. You can feel more shame, for instance, when someone else does something shameful than you would feel yourself if you did the same. For one thing, we believe more in him then he does and even when his egoism suffers more than ours because of his mistake the un-egoistic* in us is more deeply wounded by his guilt than is the un-egoistic in him.

* this word is not to be taken too seriously, but only as a modification of the expression


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

There are cases when sympathy is stronger than actual suffering. For instance, we are more pained when one of our friends is guilty of something shameful than when we do it ourselves. Sympathy can be stronger than suffering. You can feel more shame, for example, when someone else does something shameful than you would feel yourself doing the same. For one thing, we have more faith in the purity of his character than he has himself; then our love for him, probably on account of this very faith, is stronger than his love for himself. For one thing, we believe more in him then he does And even if his egoism suffers more thereby than our egoism, inasmuch as it has to bear more of the bad consequences of his fault, and even when his egoism suffers more than ours because of his mistake the un-egoistic in us—this word is not to be taken too seriously, but only as a modification of the expression—is more deeply wounded by his guilt than is the un-egoistic in him. the un-egoistic in us—this word is not to be taken too seriously, but only as a modification of the expression—is more deeply wounded by his guilt than is the un-egoistic in him.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. SYMPATHY STRONGER THAN SUFFERING.—There are cases when sympathy is stronger than actual suffering. For instance, we are more pained when one of our friends is guilty of something shameful than when we do it ourselves. For one thing, we have more faith in the purity of his character than he has himself; then our love for him, probably on account of this very faith, is stronger than his love for himself. And even if his egoism suffers more thereby than our egoism, inasmuch as it has to bear more of the bad consequences of his fault, the un-egoistic in us—this word is not to be taken too seriously, but only as a modification of the expression—is more deeply wounded by his guilt than is the un-egoistic in him.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Mitleiden stärker als Leiden. – Es giebt Fälle, wo das Mitleiden stärker ist, als das eigentliche Leiden. Wir empfinden es zum Beispiel schmerzlicher, wenn einer unserer Freunde sich etwas Schmähliches zu Schulden kommen lässt, als wenn wir selbst es thun. Einmal nämlich glauben wir mehr an die Reinheit seines Charakters, als er; sodann ist unsere Liebe zu ihm, wahrscheinlich eben dieses Glaubens wegen, stärker, als seine Liebe zu sich selbst. Wenn auch wirklich sein Egoismus mehr dabei leidet, als unser Egoismus, insofern er die übelen Folgen seines Vergehens stärker zu tragen hat, so wird das Unegoistische in uns – dieses Wort ist nie streng zu verstehen, sondern nur eine Erleichterung des Ausdrucks – doch stärker durch seine Schuld betroffen, als das Unegoistische in ihm.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 44. The Twofold early history of good and evil.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. The good are a class, the bad are a mass.

DSCF8665The history of good and evil is twofold: First in the soul of the ruling class, who can repay good with good and evil with evil is good, whoever cannot do this is bad. As a good person you belong to the “good” community because of the shared value of requital. The bad person belongs to the “bad” community that is filled with powerless people without shared values. The good are a class, the bad are a mass. Good and bad have for a long time meant the same thing as noble and base or master and slave. But remember that an enemy is not necessary bad, it is not the one who injures us, but the one who is despicable, who is called bad. Good is inherited in the good community, no bad man can come from it and if a good person does bad the excuse will be the will of a god for instance. – Secondly, in the community of the bad people all man are looked upon as hostile and cruel no matter what his rank is, evil is the word they use for all living creatures. The signs of goodness, helpfulness and pity, are looked upon with fear, interpreted as meanness, the prelude to a terrible result. With such a disposition in the individual a community could hardly exist, or at most it could exist only in its crudest form, so that in all places where this conception of good and evil reigns, the downfall of the single individuals, of their tribes and races, is at hand. Our present civilization has grown up on the bottom of the ruling tribes and castes. 


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

The conception of good and evil has a twofold early history, namely, once in the soul of the ruling tribes and castes. Whoever has the power of returning good for good, evil for evil, and really practises requital, and who is, therefore, grateful and revengeful, is called good ; The history of good and evil is twofold: First in the soul of the ruling class, who can requital or repay good with good and evil with evil is good, whoever is powerless, and unable to requite, is reckoned as bad. whoever cannot do this is bad. As a good man one is reckoned among the “good,” a community which has common feelings because the single individuals are bound to one another by the sense of requital. As a good person you belong to the “good” community because of the shared value of requital. As a bad man one belongs to the “bad,” to a party of subordinate, powerless people who have no common feeling. The bad person belongs to the “bad” community filled with powerless people without shared values. The good are a caste, the bad are a mass like dust. The good are a class, the bad are a mass. Good and bad have for a long time meant the same thing as noble and base, master and slave. Good and bad have for a long time meant the same thing as noble and base, master and slave. On the other hand, the enemy is not looked upon as evil, he can requite. In Homer the Trojan and the Greek are both good. It is not the one who injures us, but the one who is despicable, who is called bad. But remember that an enemy is not necessary bad, It is not the one who injures us, but the one who is despicable, who is called bad. Good is inherited in the community of the good ; it is impossible that a bad man could spring from such good soil. If, nevertheless, one of the good ones does something which is unworthy of the good, refuge is sought in excuses; the guilt is thrown upon a god, for instance ; it is said that he has struck the good man with blindness and madness.— Good is inherited in the good community, no bad man can come from it and if a good person does bad the excuse will be the will of a god. Then in the soul of the oppressed and powerless. Here every other man is looked upon as hostile, inconsiderate, rapacious, cruel, cunning, be he noble or base ; evil is the distinguishing word for man, even for every conceivable living creature, e.g. for a god ; human, divine, is the same thing as devilish, evil. In the community of the bad people all man are looked upon as hostile and cruel disregarding his rank, evil is the distinguishing word for all living creatures. The signs of goodness, helpfulness, pity, are looked upon with fear as spite, the prelude to a terrible result, stupefaction and out-witting,—in short, as refined malice. The signs of goodness, helpfulness and pity, are looked upon with fear as meanness, the prelude to a terrible result. With such a disposition in the individual a community could hardly exist, or at most it could exist only in its crudest form, so that in all places where this conception of good and evil obtains, the downfall of the single individuals, of their tribes and races, is at hand.—Our present civilisation has grown up on the soil of the ruling tribes and castes. With such a disposition in the individual a community could hardly exist, or at most it could exist only in its crudest form, so that in all places where this conception of good and evil obtains, the downfall of the single individuals, of their tribes and races, is at hand.—Our present civilisation has grown up on the soil of the ruling tribes and castes.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. THE TWOFOLD EARLY HISTORY OF GOOD AND EVIL.—The conception of good and evil has a twofold early history, namely, once in the soul of the ruling tribes and castes. Whoever has the power of returning good for good, evil for evil, and really practises requital, and who is, therefore, grateful and revengeful, is called good ; whoever is powerless, and unable to requite, is reckoned as bad. As a good man one is reckoned among the “good,” a community which has common feelings because the single individuals are bound to one another by the sense of requital. As a bad man one belongs to the “bad,” to a party of subordinate, powerless people who have no common feeling. The good are a caste, the bad are a mass like dust. Good and bad have for a long time meant the same thing as noble and base, master and slave. On the other hand, the enemy is not looked upon as evil, he can requite. In Homer the Trojan and the Greek are both good. It is not the one who injures us, but the one who is despicable, who is called bad. Good is inherited in the community of the good ; it is impossible that a bad man could spring from such good soil. If, nevertheless, one of the good ones does something which is unworthy of the good, refuge is sought in excuses; the guilt is thrown upon a god, for instance ; it is said that he has struck the good man with blindness and madness.—Then in the soul of the oppressed and powerless. Here every other man is looked upon as hostile, inconsiderate, rapacious, cruel, cunning, be he noble or base ; evil is the distinguishing word for man, even for every conceivable living creature, e.g. for a god ; human, divine, is the same thing as devilish, evil. The signs of goodness, helpfulness, pity, are looked upon with fear as spite, the prelude to a terrible result, stupefaction and out-witting,—in short, as refined malice. With such a disposition in the individual a community could hardly exist, or at most it could exist only in its crudest form, so that in all places where this conception of good and evil obtains, the downfall of the single individuals, of their tribes and races, is at hand.—Our present civilisation has grown up on the soil of the ruling tribes and castes.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Doppelte Vorgeschichte von Gut und Böse. – Der Begriff gut und böse hat eine doppelte Vorgeschichte: nämlich einmal in der Seele der herrschenden Stämme und Kasten. Wer die Macht zu vergelten hat, Gutes mit Gutem, Böses mit Bösem, und auch wirklich Vergeltung übt, also dankbar und rachsüchtig ist, der wird gut genannt; wer unmächtig ist und nicht vergelten kann, gilt als schlecht. Man gehört als Guter zu den “Guten”, einer Gemeinde, welche Gemeingefühl hat, weil alle Einzelnen durch den Sinn der Vergeltung mit einander verflochten sind. Man gehört als Schlechter zu den “Schlechten”, zu einem Haufen unterworfener, ohnmächtiger Menschen, welche kein Gemeingefühl haben. Die Guten sind eine Kaste, die Schlechten eine Masse wie Staub. Gut und schlecht ist eine Zeit lang so viel wie vornehm und niedrig, Herr und Sclave. Dagegen sieht man den Feind nicht als böse an: er kann vergelten. Der Troer und der Grieche sind bei Homer beide gut. Nicht Der, welcher uns Schädliches zufügt, sondern Der, welcher verächtlich ist, gilt als schlecht. In der Gemeinde der Guten vererbt sich das Gute; es ist unmöglich, dass ein Schlechter aus so gutem Erdreiche hervorwachse. Thut trotzdem Einer der Guten Etwas, das der Guten unwürdig ist, so verfällt man auf Ausflüchte; man schiebt zum Beispiel einem Gott die Schuld zu, indem man sagt: er habe den Guten mit Verblendung und Wahnsinn geschlagen. – Sodann in der Seele der Unterdrückten, Machtlosen. Hier gilt jeder andere Mensch als feindlich, rücksichtslos, ausbeutend, grausam, listig, sei er vornehm oder niedrig; böse ist das Charakterwort für Mensch, ja für jedes lebende Wesen, welches man voraussetzt, zum Beispiel für einen Gott; menschlich, göttlich gilt so viel wie teuflisch, böse. Die Zeichen der Güte, Hülfebereitschaft, Mitleid, werden angstvoll als Tücke, Vorspiel eines schrecklichen Ausgangs, Betäubung und Ueberlistung aufgenommen, kurz als verfeinerte Bosheit. Bei einer solchen Gesinnung des Einzelnen kann kaum ein Gemeinwesen entstehen, höchstens die roheste Form desselben: so dass überall, wo diese Auffassung von gut und böse herrscht, der Untergang der Einzelnen, ihrer Stämme und Rassen nahe ist. – Unsere jetzige Sittlichkeit ist auf dem Boden der herrschenden Stämme und Kasten aufgewachsen.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 44. Gratitude and revenge

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Gratitude as revenge.

DSC_2023

The reason why the powerful man is grateful is: his benefactor intruded his sphere with charity. The powerful man, in his turn, penetrates the sphere of his benefactor with gratitude. It is a milder form of revenge. Without the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man would have shown himself powerless, and would have been reckoned as such ever after. Therefore, every group of the good, originally the powerful, places gratitude amongst the first duties. Swift propounded the maxim that men were grateful in the same proportion as they were revengeful.


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

The reason why the powerful man is grateful is this : his benefactor, through the benefit he confers, has mistaken and intruded into the sphere of the powerful man, —now the latter, in return, penetrates into the sphere of the benefactor by the act of gratitude. It is a milder form of revenge. The reason why the powerful man is grateful is: his benefactor intruded the sphere of the powerful man with his charity. The powerful man, in his turn, penetrates the sphere of his benefactor with gratitude. It is a milder form of revenge. Without the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man would have shown himself powerless, and would have been reckoned as such ever after. Without the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man would have shown himself powerless, and would have been reckoned as such ever after. Therefore every society of the good, which originally meant the powerful, places gratitude amongst the first duties. Therefore every group of the good, originally the powerful, places gratitude amongst the first duties. Swift propounded the maxim that men were grateful in the same proportion as they were revengeful. Swift propounded the maxim that men were grateful in the same proportion as they were revengeful.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. GRATITUDE AND REVENGE.The reason why the powerful man is grateful is this : his benefactor, through the benefit he confers, has mistaken and intruded into the sphere of the powerful man, —now the latter, in return, penetrates into the sphere of the benefactor by the act of gratitude. It is a milder form of revenge. Without the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man would have shown himself powerless, and would have been reckoned as such ever after. Therefore every society of the good, which originally meant the powerful, places gratitude amongst the first duties.—Swift propounded the maxim that men were grateful in the same proportion as they were revengeful.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Dankbarkeit und Rache. – Der Grund, wesshalb der Mächtige dankbar ist, ist dieser. Sein Wohlthäter hat sich durch seine Wohlthat an der Sphäre des Mächtigen gleichsam vergriffen und sich in sie eingedrängt: nun vergreift er sich zur Vergeltung wieder an der Sphäre des Wohlthäters durch den Act der Dankbarkeit. Es ist eine mildere Form der Rache. Ohne die Genugthuung der Dankbarkeit zu haben, würde der Mächtige sich unmächtig gezeigt haben und fürderhin dafür gelten. Desshalb stellt jede Gesellschaft der Guten, das heisst ursprünglich der Mächtigen, die Dankbarkeit unter die ersten Pflichten. – Swift hat den Satz hingeworfen, dass Menschen in dem selben Verhältniss dankbar sind, wie sie Rache hegen.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 43. Cruel people as those who have remained.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Don’t blame the cruel people.

DSC_1687

Cruel people are the remains of past times, they are the hidden grooves in the mountain of humanity, they have inherited the rougher parts and are not as refined. They show us how we were ones, but like a block of granite, you cannot blame them for being granite. There are also grooves in our brain, like residual organs that we inherited, but these grooves and twists are no longer the bed through which the stream of our sensation flows.


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

People who are cruel nowadays must be accounted for by us as the grades of earlier civilisations which have survived ; here are exposed those deeper formations in the mountain of humanity which usually remain concealed. Cruel people are the remains of past times, they are the hidden grooves in the mountain of humanity, They are backward people whose brains, through all manner of accidents in the course of inheritance, have not been developed in so delicate and manifold a way. they have inherited only the rougher parts and are not as refined. They show us what we all were and horrify us, but they themselves are as little responsible as is a block of granite for being granite. They show us how we were ones, but like a block of granite, you cannot blame them for being granite. There must, too, be grooves and twists in our brains which answer to that condition of mind, There are also grooves, like with cruel people, in our brain as in the form of certain human organs there are supposed to be traces of a fish-state. like residual organs we inherited from our past But these grooves and twists are no longer the bed through which the stream of our sensation flows. But these grooves and twists are no longer the bed through which the stream of our sensation flows.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. CRUEL PEOPLE AS THOSE WHO HAVE REMAINED BEHIND.—People who are cruel nowadays must be accounted for by us as the grades of earlier civilisations which have survived ; here are exposed those deeper formations in the mountain of humanity which usually remain concealed. They are backward people whose brains, through all manner of accidents in the course of inheritance, have not been developed in so delicate and manifold a way. They show us what we all were and horrify us, but they themselves are as little responsible as is a block of granite for being granite. There must, too, be grooves and twists in our brains which answer to that condition of mind, as in the form of certain human organs there are supposed to be traces of a fish-state. But these grooves and twists are no longer the bed through which the stream of our sensation flows.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Grausame Menschen als zurückgeblieben. – Die Menschen, welche jetzt grausam sind, müssen uns als Stufen früherer Culturen gelten, welche übrig geblieben sind: das Gebirge der Menschheit zeigt hier einmal die tieferen Formationen, welche sonst versteckt liegen, offen. Es sind zurückgebliebene Menschen, deren Gehirn, durch alle möglichen Zufälle im Verlaufe der Vererbung, nicht so zart und vielseitig fortgebildet worden ist. Sie zeigen uns, was wir Alle waren, und machen uns erschrecken: aber sie selber sind so wenig verantwortlich, wie ein Stück Granit dafür, dass es Granit ist. In unserm Gehirne müssen sich auch Rinnen und Windungen finden, welche jener Gesinnung entsprechen, wie sich in der Form einzelner menschlicher Organe Erinnerungen an Fischzustände finden sollen. Aber diese Rinnen und Windungen sind nicht mehr das Bett, in welchem sich jetzt der Strom unserer Empfindung wälzt.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 42. The order of possessions and morality.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Morality is determined by the culture one lives in.

DSCF8627

The accepted order of things according to the level of desire, decides what is moral or immoral. Desiring physical pleasure over health or luxury over liberty is for instance immoral. This hierarchy is not fixed in time, choosing vengeance over justice was moral one times but not anymore. To be immoral means that one is not tuned to the new culture one lives in, but this person is only gradually backwards. The order of desirable things is not changed according to a moral point of view, but when it is fixed it will then determine if an action is moral or immoral. 


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

The once-accepted hierarchy of possessions, according as this or the other is coveted by a lower, higher, or highest egoism, now decides what is moral or immoral. The once accepted order of things according to the level of desire, decides who is moral. To prefer a lesser good (for instance, the gratification of the senses) to a more highly valued good (for instance, health) is accounted immoral, and also to prefer luxury to liberty. Desiring physical pleasure over health or luxury over liberty is for instance immoral. The hierarchy of possessions, however, is not fixed and equal at all times ; This hierarchy is not fixed in time.  if any one prefers vengeance to justice he is moral according to the standard of an earlier civilisation, but immoral according to the present one. Choosing vengeance over justice was moral in other times but not anymore. To be ” immoral,” therefore, denotes that an individual has not felt, or not felt sufficiently strongly, the higher, finer, spiritual motives which have come in with a new culture ; To be immoral means that one is not tuned to new culture one lives in, it marks one who has remained behind, but only according to the difference of degrees. that person is only gradually backward. The order of possessions itself is not raised and lowered according to a moral point of view ; but each time that it is fixed it supplies the decision as to whether an action is moral or immoral. The order of desirable things is not changed according to a moral point of view, but when it is fixed it will then determine if an action is moral or immoral.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. THE ORDER OF POSSESSIONS AND MORALITY.—The once-accepted hierarchy of possessions, according as this or the other is coveted by a lower, higher, or highest egoism, now decides what is moral or immoral. To prefer a lesser good (for instance, the gratification of the senses) to a more highly valued good (for instance, health) is accounted immoral, and also to prefer luxury to liberty. The hierarchy of possessions, however, is not fixed and equal at all times ; if any one prefers vengeance to justice he is moral according to the standard of an earlier civilisation, but immoral according to the present one. To be ” immoral,” therefore, denotes that an individual has not felt, or not felt sufficiently strongly, the higher, finer, spiritual motives which have come in with a new culture ; it marks one who has remained behind, but only according to the difference of degrees. The order of possessions itself is not raised and lowered according to a moral point of view ; but each time that it is fixed it supplies the decision as to whether an action is moral or immoral.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Die Ordnung der Güter und die Moral. – Die einmal angenommene Rangordnung der Güter, je nachdem ein niedriger, höherer, höchster Egoismus das Eine oder das Andere will, entscheidet jetzt über das Moralisch-sein oder Unmoralisch-sein. Ein niedriges Gut (zum Beispiel Sinnengenuss) einem höher geschätzten (zum Beispiel Gesundheit) vorziehen, gilt als unmoralisch, ebenso Wohlleben der Freiheit vorziehen. Die Rangordnung der Güter ist aber keine zu allen Zeiten feste und gleiche; wenn jemand Rache der Gerechtigkeit vorzieht, so ist er nach dem Maassstabe einer früheren Cultur moralisch, nach dem der jetzigen unmoralisch. “Unmoralisch” bezeichnet also, dass Einer die höheren, feineren, geistigeren Motive, welche die jeweilen neue Cultur hinzugebracht hat, noch nicht oder noch nicht stark genug empfindet: es bezeichnet einen Zurückgebliebenen, aber immer nur dem Gradunterschied nach. – Die Rangordnung der Güter selber wird nicht nach moralischen Gesichtspuncten auf- und umgestellt; wohl aber wird nach ihrer jedesmaligen Festsetzung darüber entschieden, ob eine Handlung moralisch oder unmoralisch sei.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 41. The unchangeable character.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Small perspective leads to small minds.

DSC_1743

That the character is unchangeable is not true in a strict sense. This popular notion only means that during our short lives, our experiences are not strong enough to change many millennia of ingrained human characteristics. But if you imagine a man of eighty thousand years old, you will have someone that has changed many times. Our short lives mislead us into forming many flawed ideas about the qualities of man. 


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

That the character is unchangeable is not true in a strict sense; That the character is unchangeable is not true in a strict sense this favorite theory means, rather, that during the short lifetime of an individual the new influencing motives cannot penetrate deeply enough to destroy the ingrained marks of many thousands of years. This popular notion only means that during our short lives our experiences are not strong enough to change thousands years of marks left by history. But if one were to imagine a man of eighty thousand years, one would have in him an absolutely changeable character, so that a number of different individuals would gradually develop out of him. The shortness of human life misleads us into forming many erroneous ideas about the qualities of man. But if you imagine a man of eighty thousand years, you will have an absolutely changeable character, so that a number of different individuals would gradually develop out of him. The shortness of human life misleads us into forming many flawed ideas about the qualities of man.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. THE UNCHANGEABLE CHARACTER.—That the character is unchangeable is not true in a strict sense; this favourite theory means, rather, that during the short lifetime of an individual the new influencing motives cannot penetrate deeply enough to destroy the ingrained marks of many thousands of years. But if one were to imagine a man of eighty thousand years, one would have in him an absolutely changeable character, so that a number of different individuals would gradually develop out of him. The shortness of human life misleads us into forming many erroneous ideas about the qualities of man.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Der unveränderliche Charakter. – Dass der Charakter unveränderlich sei, ist nicht im strengen Sinne wahr; vielmehr heisst dieser beliebte Satz nur so viel, dass während der kurzen Lebensdauer eines Menschen die einwirkenden Motive gewöhnlich nicht tief genug ritzen können, um die aufgeprägten Schriftzüge vieler Jahrtausende zu zerstören. Dächte man sich aber einen Menschen von achtzigtausend Jahren, so hätte man an ihm sogar einen absolut veränderlichen Charakter: so dass eine Fülle verschiedener Individuen sich nach und nach aus ihm entwickelte. Die Kürze des menschlichen Lebens verleitet zu manchen irrthümlichen Behauptungen über die Eigenschaften des Menschen.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 40. The super-animal.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Moral lies for the animal.

DSC_1707The animal in us likes to be lied to, morality is a lie for our own good because the truth will destroy us. Without this lie we would still be animals, but it made us feel better and we laid stricter laws on ourselves. That’s why we hate the earlier parts of our development because it is closer to our beginnings, and that can explain the hatred for slaves.


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

The beast in us wishes to be deceived ; morality is a lie of necessity in order that we may not be torn in pieces by it. The animal in us likes to be lied to, morality is a lie for our own good because the truth will destroy us. Without the errors which lie in the assumption of morality, man would have remained an animal. Thus, however, he has considered himself as something higher and has laid strict laws upon himself. Without the lie we would still be animals, but it made us believe we are better and we laid stricter laws on ourselves.  Therefore, he hates the grades which have remained nearer to animalness, whereby the former scorn of the slave, as a not-yet-man, is to be explained as a fact. That’s why we hate the earlier parts of our development because it’s closer to our beginnings, what can explain the hatred for slaves.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. THE SUPER-ANIMAL.—The beast in us wishes to be deceived ; morality is a lie of necessity in order that we may not be torn in pieces by it. Without the errors which lie in the assumption of morality, man would have remained an animal. Thus, however, he has considered himself as something higher and has laid strict laws upon himself. Therefore he hates the grades which have remained nearer to animalness, whereby the former scorn of the slave, as a not-yet-man, is to be explained as a fact.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Das Ueber-Thier. – Die Bestie in uns will belogen werden; Moral ist Nothlüge, damit wir von ihr nicht zerrissen werden. Ohne die Irrthümer, welche in den Annahmen der Moral liegen, wäre der Mensch Thier geblieben. So aber hat er sich als etwas Höheres genommen und sich strengere Gesetze auferlegt. Er hat desshalb einen Hass gegen die der Thierheit näher gebliebenen Stufen: woraus die ehemalige Missachtung des Sclaven, als eines Nicht-Menschen, als einer Sache zu erklären ist.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 39. The fable of intelligible freedom.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it/synopsis.

  1. Mistaken origin of free will and feelings.

DSCF8628The history of the impression we use to judge someone’s responsibility for their actions has the following stages. First you have good and bad actions that are judged by the results, soon these results are forgotten, and the actions are now just good or bad. Then the goodness or badness is implanted in the motive, and the action in itself is looked upon as morally ambiguous. Than we goes further by designating good or bad to a whole person instead of their actions. To evaluate, man is made responsible for his effects (the results), then for his actions, then for his motives, and finally for his nature. But finally, man discovers that our nature is determined by his place in time and space and that there is no free will. Schopenhauer does not agree with this and points out that some actions give you guild and therefore require the need for you to be responsible, if you were not responsible you could not have felt guild. But man himself, because of his determinism, is precisely the being that he is—which Schopenhauer denies. Because we can feel guild Schopenhauer thinks he can prove our liberty not with regard to what we do, but with regard to our nature, we have the freedom to be this or that way, but we cannot act this or that way. Out of the sphere of freedom and responsibility, comes the sphere of strict causality, necessity, and irresponsibility. The feeling of guild comes apparently from causality, but in reality, it comes from our freedom which is the action of a free will, the fundamental cause of the existence of an individual, his will is there before his existence. Here the twisted reasoning is followed, that the fact that there is guilt inferred the justification, the rational acceptability comes from this, this is how Schopenhauer arrives at his fantastic sequence of the so-called intelligible freedom. But the guild after the deed is not necessarily reasonable, it is most certainly not, because it is based on the wrong presumption that the feeling of guild is not a necessary result. Therefore, it is only because man believes himself to be free, not because he is free, that he experiences guild. Guild is also something you can unlearn, and it also depends on where you live, in what kind of culture, we don’t even know how old this feeling is. Nobody is responsible for his actions, nobody for his nature, to judge is identical with being unjust. This also applies when an individual judges himself. The theory is as clear as sunlight, and yet everyone prefers to go back into the shadow and the untruth, for fear of the consequences. 


Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

The history of the sentiments by means of which we make a person responsible consists of the following principal phases. The history of the impression we use to judge someone’s responsibility for their actions has the following stages. First, all single actions are called good or bad without any regard to their motives, but only on account of the useful or injurious consequences which result for the community. First you have good and bad action that are judged by the results,  But soon the origin of these distinctions is forgotten, and it is deemed that the qualities ” good ” or ” bad ” are contained in the action itself without regard to its consequences, Soon the results are forgotten and the actions are now just good or bad. by the same error according to which language describes the stone as hard,the tree as green,—with which, in short, the result is regarded as the cause. Then the goodness or badness is implanted in the motive, and the action in itself is looked upon as morally ambiguous. Then the goodness or badness is implanted in the motive, and the action in itself is looked upon as morally ambiguous. Mankind even goes further, and applies the predicate good or bad no longer to single motives, but to the whole nature of an individual, out of whom the motive grows as the plant grows out of the earth. Than man goes further by designating good or bad to a whole person instead of their actions.  Thus, in turn, man is made responsible for his operations, then for his actions, then for his motives, and finally for his nature. To evaluate, man is made responsible for his effects, then for his actions, then for his motives, and finally for his nature. Eventually it is discovered that even this nature cannot be responsible, inasmuch as it is an absolutely necessary consequence concreted out of the elements and influences of past and present things,—that man, therefore, cannot be made responsible for anything, neither for his nature, nor his motives, nor his actions, nor his effects. It has therewith come to be recognised that the history of moral valuations is at the same time the history of an error, the error of responsibility, which is based upon the error of the freedom of will. But finally man discovers that our nature is determined by his place in time and space and that there is no free will. Schopenhauer thus decided against it: because certain actions bring ill humour (“consciousness of guilt”) in their train, there must be a responsibility ; for there would be no reason for this ill humour if not only all human actions were not done of necessity,—which is actually the case and also the belief of this philosopher, Schopenhauer does not agree and points out that some actions give you guild and therefore needs you to be responsible, if you were not responsible you could not have felt guild, and Schopenhauer agrees with this. —but man himself from the same necessity is precisely the being that he is—which Schopenhauer denies. but man himself from the same necessity is precisely the being that he is—which Schopenhauer denies. From the fact of that ill humour Schopenhauer thinks he can prove a liberty which man must somehow have had, not with regard to actions, but with regard to nature Because we can feel guild Schopenhauer thinks he can prove our liberty not with regard to actions, but with regard to nature  ; liberty, therefore, to be thus or otherwise, not to act thus or otherwise. From the esse, the sphere of freedom and responsibility, there results, in his opinion, the operari, the sphere of strict causality, necessity, and irresponsibility. We have the freedom to be this or that way, but we cannot act this or that way. From the sphere of freedom and responsibility, there results, in his opinion, the sphere of strict causality, necessity, and irresponsibility. This ill humour is apparently directed to the operari,—in so far it is erroneous,—The feeling of guild comes aperently from causality, but in reality it is directed to the esse, but in reality it comes from our freedom which is the deed of a free will, the fundamental cause of the existence of an individual, which is the deed of a free will, the fundamental cause of the existence of an individual man becomes that which he wishes to be, his will is anterior to his existence. His will is there before his existence.  Here the mistaken conclusion is drawn that from the fact of the ill humour, the justification, the reasonable admissableness of this ill humour is presupposed ; and starting from this mistaken conclusion, Schopenhauer arrives at his fantastic sequence of the so-called intelligible freedom. Here the twisted reasoning is followed, that from guilt the justification, the rational acceptability of this regret is derived, this is how Schopenhauer arrives at his fantastic sequence of the so-called intelligible freedom. But the ill humour after the deed is not necessarily reasonable, indeed it is assuredly not reasonable, But the guild after the deed is not necessarily reasonable, it is most certainly not, for it is based upon the erroneous presumption that the action need not have inevitably followed. Because it is based on the wrong presumption that the feeling of guild is not a necessary result. Therefore, it is only because man believes himself to be free, not because he is free, that he experiences remorse and pricks of conscience. Therefore, it is only because man believes himself to be free, not because he is free, that he experiences guild.Moreover, this ill humour is a habit that can be broken off; in many people it is entirely absent in connection with actions where others experience it. It is a very changeable thing, and one which is connected with the development of customs and culture, and probably only existing during a comparatively short period of the world’s history. Guild is also something you can unlearn, and it also depends on where you live, in what kind of culture. We don’t even know how old this feeling is. Nobody is responsible for his actions, nobody for his nature ; to judge is identical with being unjust. Nobody is responsible for his actions, nobody for his nature ; to judge is identical with being unjust. This also applies when an individual judges himself. The theory is as clear as sunlight, and yet every one prefers to go back into the shadow and the untruth, for fear of the consequences. This also applies when an individual judges himself. The theory is as clear as sunlight, and yet every one prefers to go back into the shadow and the untruth, for fear of the consequences.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. THE FABLE OF INTELLIGIBLE FREEDOM.—The history of the sentiments by means of which we make a person responsible consists of the following principal phases. First, all single actions are called good or bad without any regard to their motives, but only on account of the useful or injurious consequences which result for the community. But soon the origin of these distinctions is forgotten, and it is deemed that the qualities ” good ” or ” bad ” are contained in the action itself without regard to its consequences, by the same error according to which language describes the stone as hard,the tree as green,—with which, in short, the result is regarded as the cause. Then the goodness or badness is implanted in the motive, and the action in itself is looked upon as morally ambiguous. Mankind even goes further, and applies the predicate good or bad no longer to single motives, but to the whole nature of an individual, out of whom the motive grows as the plant grows out of the earth. Thus, in turn, man is made responsible for his operations, then for his actions, then for his motives, and finally for his nature. Eventually it is discovered that even this nature cannot be responsible, inasmuch as it is an absolutely necessary consequence concreted out of the elements and influences of past and present things,—that man, therefore, cannot be made responsible for anything, neither for his nature, nor his motives, nor his actions, nor his effects. It has therewith come to be recognised that the history of moral valuations is at the same time the history of an error, the error of responsibility, which is based upon the error of the freedom of will. Schopenhauer thus decided against it: because certain actions bring ill humour (“consciousness of guilt”) in their train, there must be a responsibility ; for there would be no reason for this ill humour if not only all human actions were not done of necessity,—which is actually the case and also the belief of this philosopher,—but man himself from the same necessity is precisely the being that he is—which Schopenhauer denies. From the fact of that ill humour Schopenhauer thinks he can prove a liberty which man must somehow have had, not with regard to actions, but with regard to nature ; liberty, therefore, to be thus or otherwise, not to act thus or otherwise. From the esse, the sphere of freedom and responsibility, there results, in his opinion, the operari, the sphere of strict causality, necessity, and irresponsibility. This ill humour is apparently directed to the operari,—in so far it is erroneous,—but in reality it is directed to the esse, which is the deed of a free will, the fundamental cause of the existence of an individual, man becomes that which he wishes to be, his will is anterior to his existence. Here the mistaken conclusion is drawn that from the fact of the ill humour, the justification, the reasonable admissableness of this ill humour is presupposed ; and starting from this mistaken conclusion, Schopenhauer arrives at his fantastic sequence of the so-called intelligible freedom. But the ill humour after the deed is not necessarily reasonable, indeed it is assuredly not reasonable, for it is based upon the erroneous presumption that the action need not have inevitably followed. Therefore, it is only because man believes himself to be free, not because he is free, that he experiences remorse and pricks of conscience. Moreover, this ill humour is a habit that can be broken off; in many people it is entirely absent in connection with actions where others experience it. It is a very changeable thing, and one which is connected with the development of customs and culture, and probably only existing during a comparatively short period of the world’s history. Nobody is responsible for his actions, nobody for his nature ; to judge is identical with being unjust. This also applies when an individual judges himself. The theory is as clear as sunlight, and yet every one prefers to go back into the shadow and the untruth, for fear of the consequences.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Die Fabel von der intelligibelen Freiheit. – Die Geschichte der Empfindungen, vermöge deren wir jemanden verantwortlich machen, also der sogenannten moralischen Empfindungen verläuft, in folgenden Hauptphasen. Zuerst nennt man einzelne Handlungen gut oder böse ohne alle Rücksicht auf deren Motive, sondern allein der nützlichen oder schädlichen Folgen wegen. Bald aber vergisst man die Herkunft dieser Bezeichnungen und wähnt, dass den Handlungen an sich, ohne Rücksicht auf deren Folgen, die Eigenschaft “gut” oder “böse” innewohne: mit demselben Irrthume, nach welchem die Sprache den Stein selber als hart, den Baum selber als grün bezeichnet – also dadurch, dass man, was Wirkung ist, als Ursache fasst. Sodann legt man das Gut- oder Böse-sein in die Motive hinein und betrachtet die Thaten an sich als moralisch zweideutig. Man geht weiter und giebt das Prädicat gut oder böse nicht mehr dem einzelnen Motive, sondern dem ganzen Wesen eines Menschen, aus dem das Motiv, wie die Pflanze aus dem Erdreich, herauswächst. So macht man der Reihe nach den Menschen für seine Wirkungen, dann für seine Handlungen, dann für seine Motive und endlich für sein Wesen verantwortlich. Nun entdeckt man schliesslich, dass auch dieses Wesen nicht verantwortlich sein kann, insofern es ganz und gar nothwendige Folge ist und aus den Elementen und Einflüssen vergangener und gegenwärtiger Dinge concrescirt: also dass der Mensch für Nichts verantwortlich zu machen ist, weder für sein Wesen, noch seine Motive, noch seine Handlungen, noch seine Wirkungen. Damit ist man zur Erkenntniss gelangt, dass die Geschichte der moralischen Empfindungen die Geschichte eines Irrthums, des Irrthums von der Verantwortlichkeit ist: als welcher auf dem Irrthum von der Freiheit des Willens ruht. -Schopenhauer schloss dagegen so: weil gewisse Handlungen Unmuth (“Schuldbewusstsein”) nach sich ziehen, so muss es eine Verantwortlichkeit geben; denn zu diesem Unmuth wäre kein Grund vorhanden, wenn nicht nur alles Handeln des Menschen mit Nothwendigkeit verliefe – wie es thatsächlich, und auch nach der Einsicht dieses Philosophen, verläuft -, sondern der Mensch selber mit der selben Nothwendigkeit sein ganzes Wesen erlangte, – was Schopenhauer leugnet. Aus der Thatsache jenes Unmuthes glaubt Schopenhauer eine Freiheit beweisen zu können, welche der Mensch irgendwie gehabt haben müsse, zwar nicht in Bezug auf die Handlungen, aber in Bezug auf das Wesen: Freiheit also, so oder so zu sein, nicht so oder so zu handeln. Aus dem esse, der Sphäre der Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit, folgt nach seiner Meinung das operari, die Sphäre der strengen Causalität, Nothwendigkeit und Unverantwortlichkeit. Jener Unmuth beziehe sich zwar scheinbar auf das operari – insofern sei er irrthümlich -, in Wahrheit aber auf das esse, welches die That eines freien Willens, die Grundursache der Existenz eines Individuums, sei; der Mensch werde Das, was er werden wolle, sein Wollen sei früher, als seine Existenz. – Hier wird der Fehlschluss gemacht, dass aus der Thatsache des Unmuthes die Berechtigung, die vernünftige Zulässigkeit dieses Unmuthes geschlossen wird; und von jenem Fehlschluss aus kommt Schopenhauer zu seiner phantastischen Consequenz der sogenannten intelligibelen Freiheit. Aber der Unmuth nach der That braucht gar nicht vernünftig zu sein: ja er ist es gewiss nicht, denn er ruht auf der irrthümlichen Voraussetzung, dass die That eben nicht nothwendig hätte erfolgen müssen. Also: weil sich der Mensch für frei hält, nicht aber weil er frei ist, empfindet er Reue und Gewissensbisse. – Ueberdiess ist dieser Unmuth Etwas, das man sich abgewöhnen kann, bei vielen Menschen ist er in Bezug auf Handlungen gar nicht vorhanden, bei welchen viele andere Menschen ihn empfinden. Er ist eine sehr wandelbare, an die Entwickelung der Sitte und Cultur geknüpfte Sache und vielleicht nur in einer verhältnissmässig kurzen Zeit der Weltgeschichte vorhanden. -Niemand ist für seine Thaten verantwortlich, Niemand für sein Wesen; richten ist soviel als ungerecht sein. Diess gilt auch, wenn das Individuum über sich selbst richtet. Der Satz ist so hell wie Sonnenlicht, und doch geht hier jedermann lieber in den Schatten und die Unwahrheit zurück: aus Furcht vor den Folgen.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 38. How far useful.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it.

  1. Keep it cool if you can handle the truth.

DSC_2245We will never know if psychological observations are good or bad for society, but science needs it. Science however, is not interested in final aims, just like nature. But like a good copier of nature, science will also come up with useful ideas that benefit mankind, it does this also without intention. But whoever feels too chilled by the breath of such a reflection has perhaps too little fire in himself. But look around and you see them, people that are made of fire and who are not afraid of these ideas. Additionally, like serious people need some joy and enthusiastic people need something heavy to aide their health, should not we, intellectuals, who grow more inflamed, not be cooled down as to maintain a certain harmlessness and maybe be useful in this age as a mirror for self-reflection?


 Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

It must remain for ever undecided whether psychological observation is advantageous or disadvantageous to man; but it is certain that it is necessary, because science cannot do without it. We will never know if psychological observations are good or bad for society, but science needs it. Science, however, has no consideration for ultimate purposes, any more than Nature has, Science however, is not interested in final aims, just like nature. but just as the latter occasionally achieves things of the greatest suitableness without intending to do so, so also true science, as the imitator of nature in ideas, will occasionally and in many ways further the usefulness and welfare of man,—but also without intending to do so. But like a good copier of nature, science will also come up with useful ideas that benefit mankind, it does this also without intention. But whoever feels too chilled by the breath of such a reflection has perhaps too little fire in himself; But whoever feels too chilled by the breath of such a reflection has perhaps too little fire in himself let him look around him meanwhile and he will become aware of illnesses which have need of ice-poultices, and of men who are so ” kneaded together ” of heat and spirit that they can hardly find an atmosphere that is cold and biting enough. But look around and you see diseases that need ice bandages and people that are made of fire.   Moreover, as individuals and nations that are too serious have need of frivolities, as others too mobile and excitable have need occasionally of heavily oppressing burdens for the sake of their health, Moreover, like serious people need some joy and enthusiastic people need something heavy to aide their health, should not we, the more intellectual people of this age, that grows visibly more and more inflamed, seize all quenching and cooling means that exist, in order that we may at least remain as constant, harmless, and moderate as we still are, Should not we, intellectuals, who grow more inflamed not be cooled down as to maintain a certain harmlessness  and thus, perhaps, serve some time or other as mirror and self-contemplation for this age ? and maybe be useful in this age as a mirror for self-reflection.


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

  1. HOW FAR USEFUL.—It must remain for ever undecided whether psychological observation is advantageous or disadvantageous to man ; but it is certain that it is necessary, because science cannot do without it. Science, however, has no consideration for ultimate purposes, any more than Nature has, but just as the latter occasionally achieves things of the greatest suitableness without intending to do so, so also true science, as the imitator of nature in ideas, will occasionally and in many ways further the usefulness and welfare of man,—but also without intending to do so.But whoever feels too chilled by the breath of such a reflection has perhaps too little fire in himself; let him look around him meanwhile and he will become aware of illnesses which have need of ice-poultices, and of men who are so ” kneaded together ” of heat and spirit that they can hardly find an atmosphere that is cold and biting enough. Moreover, as individuals and nations that are too serious have need of frivolities, as others too mobile and excitable have need occasionally of heavily oppressing burdens for the sake of their health, should not we, the more intellectual people of this age, that grows visibly more and more inflamed, seize all quenching and cooling means that exist, in order that we may at least remain as constant, harmless, and moderate as we still are, and thus, perhaps, serve some time or other as mirror and self-contemplation for this age ?

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Inwiefern nützlich. – Also: ob die psychologische Beobachtung mehr Nutzen oder Nachtheil über die Menschen bringe, das bleibe immerhin unentschieden; aber fest steht, dass sie nothwendig ist, weil die Wissenschaft ihrer nicht entrathen kann. Die Wissenschaft aber kennt keine Rücksichten auf letzte Zwecke, ebenso wenig als die Natur sie kennt: sondern wie diese gelegentlich Dinge von der höchsten Zweckmässigkeit zu Stande bringt, ohne sie gewollt zu haben, so wird auch die ächte Wissenschaft, als die Nachahmung der Natur in Begriffen, den Nutzen und die Wohlfahrt der Menschen gelegentlich, ja vielfach, fördern und das Zweckmässige erreichen, – aber ebenfalls ohne es gewollt zu haben. Wem es aber bei dem Anhauche einer solchen Betrachtungsart gar zu winterlich zu Muthe wird, der hat vielleicht nur zu wenig Feuer in sich: er möge sich indessen umsehen und er wird Krankheiten wahrnehmen, in denen Eisumschläge noth thun, und Menschen, welche so aus Gluth und Geist “zusammengeknetet” sind, dass sie kaum irgendwo die Luft kalt und schneidend genug für sich finden. Ueberdiess: wie allzu ernste Einzelne und Völker ein Bedürfniss nach Leichtfertigkeiten haben, wie andere allzu Erregbare und Bewegliche zeitweilig schwere niederdrückende Lasten zu ihrer Gesundheit nöthig haben: sollten wir, die geistigeren Menschen eines Zeitalters, welches ersichtlich immer mehr in Brand geräth, nicht nach allen löschenden und kühlenden Mitteln, die es giebt, greifen müssen, damit wir wenigstens so stetig, harmlos und mässig bleiben, als wir es noch sind, und so vielleicht einmal dazu brauchbar werden, diesem Zeitalter als Spiegel und Selbstbesinnung über sich zu dienen? –

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

Human all too human: 37. Nevertheless.

Reading Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human all too human

Read the introduction here You can read the aphorism I discuss here in English and German below the main article.

My take on it.

  1. Research into morals have to be taken serious again.

DSC_1686Whatever you think of philosophy, the reanimation of moral observation is necessary. Important for this is the science that ask for the origins of moral sentiments and that solves complicated sociological problems, something the older philosophy did not do. The consequences can be seen in the wrong explanation of certain human actions and sensations by great philosophers. Like with the idea of unselfish actions and the false ethics that came from it, followed by a confused religion and a clouding of common sense. But superficial psychology seems to be the biggest enemy of progress and there is a lot of tedious work ahead. There is also a lot of bourgeoisie in popular psychology and serious researcher have to overcome that hurdle and make it a respectable science again, but results are already coming in from them. You can read it in the book: “On the Origin of Moral Sensations“ from Paul Ree.1 ” The moral man,” he says, ” is no nearer to the intelligible (metaphysical) world than is the physical man.” This idea, hardened by historical knowledge, may bringing down the ” metaphysical need ” of man, and if this good or bad for general wellbeing is hard to say, but it is important, and both fruitful and terrible like every two-face is looking in the world.


 Text from the translation by Helen Zimmern and my take on it

However it may be with reckoning and counter-reckoning, in the present condition of philosophy the awakening of moral observation is necessary. Humanity can no longer be spared the cruel sight of the psychological dissecting-table with its knives and forceps. Whatever you think of philosophy, reanimation of moral observation is necessary. For here rules that science which inquires into the origin and history of the so-called moral sentiments, and which, in its progress, has to draw up and solve complicated sociological problems: What rules in this area is the science that ask for the origins of moral sentiments and solve complicated sociological problems,   —the older philosophy knows the latter one not at all, and has always avoided the examination of the origin and history of moral sentiments on any feeble pretext. the older philosophy did none of that. With what consequences it is now very easy to see, after it has been shown by many examples how the mistakes of the greatest philosophers generally have their starting-point in a wrong explanation of certain human actions and sensations, The consequences can be seen in the wrong explanation of certain human actions and sensations by great philosophers. just as on the ground of an erroneous analysis—for instance, that of the so-called unselfish actions—a false ethic is built up ; then, to harmonise with this again, religion and mythological confusion are brought in to assist, and finally the shades of these dismal spirits fall also over physics and the general mode of regarding the world. Like with unselfish actions and the falls ethics that came from followed up by a confused religion and a clouding of physics and common thought. If it is certain, however, that superficiality in psychological observation has laid, and still lays, the most dangerous snares for human judgments and conclusions, then there is need now of that endurance of work which does not grow weary of piling stone upon stone, pebble on pebble; there is need of courage not to be ashamed of such humble work and to turn a deaf ear to scorn. But superficial psychology seems to be the biggest enemy of progress and there is a lot of tedious work ahead. And this is also true,—numberless single observations on the human and all-too-human have first been discovered, and given utterance to, in circles of society which were accustomed to offer sacrifice therewith to a clever desire to please, and not to scientific knowledge,—and the odour of that old home of the moral maxim, a very seductive odour, has attached itself almost inseparably to the whole species, so that on its account the scientific man involuntarily betrays a certain distrust of this species and its earnestness. And there is a lot of bourgeoisie in popular psychology and serious researcher have to overcome that. But it is sufficient to point to the consequences, for already it begins to be seen what results of a serious kind spring from the ground of psychological observation. But results are already coming in from serious research. What, after all, is the principal axiom to which the boldest and coldest thinker, the author of the book On the Origin of Moral Sensations, [5]has attained by means of his incisive and decisive analyses of human actions ? You can already read it in the book from Paul Ree.1 ” The moral man,” he says, ” is no nearer to the intelligible (metaphysical) world than is the physical man.” ” The moral man,” he says, ” is no nearer to the intelligible (metaphysical) world than is the physical man.” This theory, hardened and sharpened under the hammer-blow of historical knowledge, may some time or other, perhaps in some future period, serve as the axe which is applied to the root of the ” metaphysical need ” of man, This idea, hardened by historical knowledge, by bring down the ” metaphysical need ” of man, —whether more as a blessing than a curse to the general welfare it is not easy to say, but in any case as a theory with the most important consequences, at once fruitful and terrible, and looking into the world with that Janus-face which all great knowledge possesses. If it is for good or for bad for general wellbeing is hard to say, but it is important, both fruitful and terrible like every two-face is looking in the world.

1 Note form Hollingdale’s translation: The author of the book On the Origin of the Moral Sensations: again Paul Ree; the book, which is Ree’s chief work, was written during 1876-7 in the house in Sorrento in which Nietzsche was at the same time writing Human, All To Human


Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I translated by Helen Zimmern 1909

37.NEVERTHELESS.—However it may be with reckoning and counter-reckoning, in t he present condition of philosophy the awakening of moral observation is necessary. Humanity can no longer be spared the cruel sight of the psychological dissecting-table with its knives and forceps. For here rules that science which inquires into the origin and history of the so-called moral sentiments, and which, in its progress, has to draw up and solve complicated sociological problems:—the older philosophy knows the latter one not at all, and has always avoided the examination of the origin and history of moral sentiments on any feeble pretext. With what consequences it is now very easy to see, after it has been shown by many examples how the mistakes of the greatest philosophers generally have their starting-point in a wrong explanation of certain human actions and sensations, just as on the ground of an erroneous analysis—for instance, that of the so-called unselfish actions—a false ethic is built up ; then, to harmonise with this again, religion and mythological confusion are brought in to assist, and finally the shades of these dismal spirits fall also over physics and the general mode of regarding the world. If it is certain, however, that superficiality in psychological observation has laid, and still lays, the most dangerous snares for human judgments and conclusions, then there is need now of that endurance of work which does not grow weary of piling stone upon stone, pebble on pebble; there is need of courage not to be ashamed of such humble work and to turn a deaf ear to scorn. And this is also true,—numberless single observations on the human and all-too-human have first been discovered, and given utterance to, in circles of society which were accustomed to offer sacrifice therewith to a clever desire to please, and not to scientific knowledge,—and the odour of that old home of the moral maxim, a very seductive odour, has attached itself almost inseparably to the whole species, so that on its account the scientific man involuntarily betrays a certain distrust of this species and its earnestness. But it is sufficient to point to the consequences, for already it begins to be seen what results of a serious kind spring from the ground of psychological observation. What, after all, is the principal axiom to which the boldest and coldest thinker, the author of the book On the Origin of Moral Sensations, [5]has attained by means of his incisive and decisive analyses of human actions ? ” The moral man,” he says, ” is no nearer to the intelligible (metaphysical) world than is the physical man.” This theory, hardened and sharpened under the hammer-blow of historical knowledge, may some time or other, perhaps in some future period, serve as the axe which is applied to the root of the ” metaphysical need ” of man,—whether more as a blessing than a curse to the general welfare it is not easy to say, but in any case as a theory with the most important consequences, at once fruitful and terrible, and looking into the world with that Janus-face which all great knowledge possesses.

Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80

  1. Trotzdem.- Wie es sich nun mit Rechnung und Gegenrechnung verhalte: in dem gegenwärtigen Zustande einer bestimmten einzelnen Wissenschaft ist die Auferweckung der moralischen Beobachtung nöthig geworden, und der grausame Anblick des psychologischen Secirtisches und seiner Messer und Zangen kann der Menschheit nicht erspart bleiben. Denn hier gebietet jene Wissenschaft, welche nach Ursprung und Geschichte der sogenannten moralischen Empfindungen fragt und welche im Fortschreiten die verwickelten sociologischen Probleme aufzustellen und zu lösen hat: – die ältere Philosophie kennt die letzteren gar nicht und ist der Untersuchung von Ursprung und Geschichte der moralischen Empfindungen unter dürftigen Ausflüchten immer aus dem Wege gegangen. Mit welchen Folgen: das lässt sich jetzt sehr deutlich überschauen, nachdem an vielen Beispielen nachgewiesen ist, wie die Irrthümer der grössten Philosophen gewöhnlich ihren Ausgangspunct in einer falschen Erklärung bestimmter menschlicher Handlungen und Empfindungen haben, wie auf Grund einer irrthümlichen Analysis, zum Beispiel der sogenannten unegoistischen Handlungen, eine falsche Ethik sich aufbaut, dieser zu Gefallen dann wiederum Religion und mythologisches Unwesen zu Hülfe genommen werden, und endlich die Schatten dieser trüben Geister auch in die Physik und die gesammte Weltbetrachtung hineinfallen. Steht es aber fest, dass die Oberflächlichkeit der psychologischen Beobachtung dem menschlichen Urtheilen und Schliessen die gefährlichsten Fallstricke gelegt hat und fortwährend von Neuem legt, so bedarf es jetzt jener Ausdauer der Arbeit, welche nicht müde wird, Steine auf Steine, Steinchen auf Steinchen zu häufen, so bedarf es der enthaltsamen Tapferkeit, um sich einer solchen bescheidenen Arbeit nicht zu schämen und jeder Missachtung derselben Trotz zu bieten. Es ist wahr: zahllose einzelne Bemerkungen über Menschliches und Allzumenschliches sind in Kreisen der Gesellschaft zuerst entdeckt und ausgesprochen worden, welche gewohnt waren, nicht der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntniss, sondern einer geistreichen Gefallsucht jede Art von Opfern darzubringen; und fast unlösbar hat sich der Duft jener alten Heimath der moralistischen Sentenz – ein sehr verführerischer Duft – der ganzen Gattung angehängt: so dass seinetwegen der wissenschaftliche Mensch unwillkürlich einiges Misstrauen gegen diese Gattung und ihre Ernsthaftigkeit merken lässt. Aber es genügt, auf die Folgen zu verweisen: denn schon jetzt beginnt sich zu zeigen, welche Ergebnisse ernsthaftester Art auf dem Boden der psychologischen Beobachtung aufwachsen. Welches ist doch der Hauptsatz zu dem einer der kühnsten und kältesten Denker, der Verfasser des Buches “Ueber den Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen” vermöge seiner ein- und durchschneidenden Analysen des menschlichen Handelns gelangt? “Der moralische Mensch, sagt er, steht der intelligiblen (metaphysischen) Welt nicht näher, als der physische Mensch.” Dieser Satz, hart und schneidig geworden unter dem Hammerschlag der historischen Erkenntniss, kann vielleicht einmal, in irgendwelcher Zukunft, als die Axt dienen, welche dem “metaphysischen Bedürfniss” der Menschen an die Wurzel gelegt wird, – ob mehr zum Segen, als zum Fluche der allgemeinen Wohlfahrt, wer wüsste das zu sagen? – aber jedenfalls als ein Satz der erheblichsten Folgen, fruchtbar und furchtbar zugleich, und mit jenem Doppelgesichte in die Welt sehend, welches alle grossen Erkenntnisse haben.

Sources:

I will read a Dutch translation that is based on the work of researchers Colli and Montinari. I also use a translation from R.J.Hollingdale and the Gary Handwerk translation from the Colli-Montinari edition. Both are more modern than the copyright free translation I use here. This is a translation from 1909 by Helen Zimmern, who knew Nietzsche personally, but there was no critical study of Nietzsche’s work done back then and this translation suffers from that. The same goes for the translation from Alexander Harvey. My German is not good enough to pretend that I can translate it better than the professionals do but I will use the original as a referee.

  1. Menselijk al te menselijk een boek voor vrije geesten, translated by Thomas Graftdijk, 2000. Buy it here
  2. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by R.J.Hollingdale, 1986
  3. Human, all too human a book for free spirits I V3, translated by Gary handwerk 1997
  4. Human, all too human a book for free spirits Part I, translated by Helen Zimmern 1909. Read it  here
  5. Human, all too human a book for free spirits, translated by Alexander Harvey, 1908. Read it here
  6. Menschliches allzu menschlich 1878/80. Read it here

 

 

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