358 Grounds and their groundlessness. -You dislike him and present many grounds for this dislike – but I believe only in your dislike, not in your grounds! You flatter yourself in your own eyes when you suggest to yourself and to me that what has happened through instinct is the result of a process of reasoning.
In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency (or distinctively human agency). Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events.
Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research (including psychology, cognitive neuroscience, social science, and anthropology). In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act.
Read the rest here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/
Introduced into the philosophical lexicon during the Eighteenth Century, the term ‘aesthetic’ has come to designate, among other things, a kind of object, a kind of judgment, a kind of attitude, a kind of experience, and a kind of value. For the most part, aesthetic theories have divided over questions particular to one or another of these designations: whether artworks are necessarily aesthetic objects; how to square the allegedly perceptual basis of aesthetic judgments with the fact that we give reasons in support of them; how best to capture the elusive contrast between an aesthetic attitude and a practical one; whether to define aesthetic experience according to its phenomenological or representational content; how best to understand the relation between aesthetic value and aesthetic experience. But questions of more general nature have lately arisen, and these have tended to have a skeptical cast: whether any use of ‘aesthetic’ may be explicated without appeal to some other; whether agreement respecting any use is sufficient to ground meaningful theoretical agreement or disagreement; whether the term ultimately answers to any legitimate philosophical purpose that justifies its inclusion in the lexicon. The skepticism expressed by such general questions did not begin to take hold until the later part of the 20th century, and this fact prompts the question whether (a) the concept of the aesthetic is inherently problematic and it is only recently that we have managed to see that it is, or (b) the concept is fine and it is only recently that we have become muddled enough to imagine otherwise. Adjudicating between these possibilities requires a vantage from which to take in both early and late theorizing on aesthetic matters.
Read the rest here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/
Suppose that you have been invited to attend an ex-partner’s wedding and that the best thing you can do is accept the invitation and be pleasant at the wedding. But, suppose furthermore that if you do accept the invitation, you’ll freely decide to get inebriated at the wedding and ruin it for everyone, which would be the worst outcome. The second best thing to do would be to simply decline the invitation. In light of these facts, should you accept or decline the invitation? (Zimmerman 2006: 153). The answer to this question hinges on the actualism/possibilism debate in ethics, which concerns the relationship between an agent’s free actions and her moral obligations. In particular, it focuses on whether facts about how an agent would freely act in certain contexts play any role in determining the agent’s moral obligations. Historically, the debate has primarily arisen in the work of impartial consequentialists with an interest in deontic logic. However, its relevance is not limited to such versions of consequentialism. The debate concerns the scope of acts that are relevant options for the agent, which is an issue that cuts across, and has substantive implications for, a wide range of normative ethical views. As such, the debate brings into focus issues of central importance for any normative ethical theory.
Read the rest here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/
Action is a means of acquiring perceptual information about the environment. Turning around, for example, alters your spatial relations to surrounding objects and, hence, which of their properties you visually perceive. Moving your hand over an object’s surface enables you to feel its shape, temperature, and texture. Sniffing and walking around a room enables you to track down the source of an unpleasant smell. Active or passive movements of the body can also generate useful sources of perceptual information (Gibson 1966, 1979). The pattern of optic flow in the retinal image produced by forward locomotion, for example, contains information about the direction in which you are heading, while motion parallax is a “cue” used by the visual system to estimate the relative distances of objects in your field of view. In these uncontroversial ways and others, perception is instrumentally dependent on action. According to an explanatory framework that Susan Hurley (1998) dubs the “Input-Output Picture”, the dependence of perception on action is purely instrumental:
The distinction between essential versus accidental properties has been characterized in various ways, but it is often understood in modal terms: an essential property of an object is a property that it must have, while an accidental property of an object is one that it happens to have but that it could lack. Let’s call this the basic modal characterization, where a modal characterization of a notion is one that explains the notion in terms of necessity/possibility. In the characterization just given of the distinction between essential and accidental properties, the use of the word “must” reflects the fact that necessity is invoked, while the use of the word “could” reflects that possibility is invoked. The notions of necessity and possibility are interdefinable: to say that something is necessary is to say that its negation is not possible; to say that something is possible is to say that its negation is not necessary; to say that an object must have a certain property is to say that it could not lack it; and to say that an object could have a certain property is to say that it is not the case that it must lack it.
Read the rest here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental/
In philosophy, accidental properties are properties an object has contingently, not essentially.
An accidental property is one that a thing can gain or lose without ceasing to be what it is. Example:
– A chair being red.
– Socrates being bald.
– This book lying on the table.
If the property changes, the object remains the same kind of thing.
This contrasts with essential properties, which an object must have to be what it is. Example:
– A triangle having three sides.
– A human being rational (in the Aristotelian sense).
The distinction goes back to Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics. Accidental properties depend on circumstances, relations, or states, not on the object’s defining nature.
In short: accidental properties describe how something happens to be, not what it is.
An accident (Greek συμβεβηκός), in metaphysics and philosophy, is a property that the entity or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. An accident does not affect its essence, according to many philosophers. It does not mean an “accident” as used in common speech, a chance incident, normally harmful. Examples of accidents are color, taste, movement, and stagnation. Accident is contrasted with essence: a designation for the property or set of properties that make an entity or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity.
Aristotle made a distinction between the essential and accidental properties of a thing. Thomas Aquinas and other Catholic theologians have employed the Aristotelian concepts of substance and accident in articulating the theology of the Eucharist, particularly the transubstantiation of bread and wine into body and blood.
In modern philosophy, an accident (or accidental property) is the union of two concepts: property and contingency. Non-essentialism argues that every property is an accident. Modal necessitarianism argues that all properties are essential and no property is an accident.
Read the rest here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accident_(philosophy)
Do you lift a roof over your head
or is the lifting
roof enough?
Do any of them keep the rain out?
ABSURD, THE. A term used by existentialists to describe that which one might have thought to be amenable to reason but which turns out to be beyond the limits of rationality. For example, in Sartre’s philosophy the ‘original choice’ of one’s fundamental project is said to be ‘absurd’, since, although choices are normally made for reasons, this choice lies beyond reason because all reasons for choice are supposed to be grounded in one’s fundamental
project. Arguably, this case in fact shows that Sartre is mistaken in supposing that reasons for choice are themselves grounded in a choice; and one can argue that other cases which are supposed to involve experience of the ‘absurd’ are in fact a *reductio ad absurdum of the assumptions which produce this conclusion. The ‘absurd’ does not in fact play an essential role within existentialist philosophy; but it is an important aspect of the broader cultural context of existentialism, for example in the ‘theatre of the absurd’, as exemplified by the plays of Samuel Beckett.
ABSTRACTION. A putative psychological process for the acquisition of a concept x either by attending to the features common to all and only xs* or by disregarding just the spatiotemporal locations of xs. The existence of abstraction is endorsed by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (esp. II. xi. 9 and 10 and III. iii. 6 ff.) but rejected by Berkeley in The Principles of Human Knowledge (esp. paras. 6 ff. and paras. 98, 119, and 125). For Locke the capacity to abstract distinguishes human beings from animals. It enables them to think in abstract ideas and hence use language. Berkeley argues that the concept of an abstract *idea is incoherent because it entails both the inclusion and the exclusion of one and the same property. This in turn is because any such putative idea would have to be general enough to subsume all xs yet precise enough to subsume only xs. For example, the abstract idea of triangle ‘is neither oblique nor rectangular, equilateral norscalenon, but all and none of these at once’ (The Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, para. 13).
ABSTRACT ENTITIES. The dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete is supposed to effect a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ontological classification. The dichotomy is, however, too naïve to be of theoretical use. There are many different ways, themselves vague, to mark the distinction: abstract entities are not perceptible, cannot be pointed to, have no causes or effects, have no spatio-temporal location, are necessarily existent. Nor is
there agreement about whether there are any abstract entities, and, if so, which sorts of entity are abstract. Abstract entities, conceived as having no causal powers, are thought problematic for epistemological reasons: how can we refer to or know anything about entities with which we have no causal commerce? Hence the existence of nominalists, who try to do without abstract entities.
ABSOLUTISM, MORAL. The view that certain kinds of actions are always wrong or are always obligatory, whatever the consequences. Typical candidates for such absolute principles would be that it is always wrong deliberately to kill an innocent human being, or that one ought always to tell the truth or to keep one’s promises. Absolutism is to be contrasted with *consequentialism, the view that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined solely by the extent to which they lead to good or bad consequences. A consequentialist could maintain, for example, that *killing is normally wrong because it creates a great deal of grief and suffering and deprives the person who is killed of the future happiness which he/she would have experienced, but that since, in some cases, a refusal to kill may lead to even more suffering and loss of happiness, it may sometimes be fight even to kill the innocent.
ABSOLUTE, the. That which has an unconditioned existence, not conditioned by, relative to, or dependent upon anything else. Usually deemed to be the whole of things, conceived as unitary, as spiritual, as self-knowing (at least in part via the human mind), and as rationally intelligible, as finite things, considered individually, are not. The expression was introduced into philosophy by Schelling and Hegel. In the English-speaking world it became the key concept of such absolute idealists as Josiah Royce and F. H. Bradley.
ABDUCTION. Abductive reasoning accepts a conclusion on the grounds that it explains the available evidence. The term was introduced by Charles Peirce to describe an inference pattern sometimes called ‘hypothesis’ or *’inference to the best explanation’. He used the example of arriving at a Turkish seaport and observing a man on horseback surrounded by horsemen holding a canopy over his head. He inferred that this was the governor of the province since he could think of no other figure who would be so greatly honoured. In his later work, Peirce used the word more widely: the logic of abduction examines all of the norms which guide us in formulating new hypotheses and deciding which of them to take seriously. It addresses a wide range of issues concerning the ‘logic of discovery’ and the economics of research.
ABANDONMENT. A rhetorical term used by existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre to describe the absence of any sources of ethical authority external to oneself. It suggests that one might have expected to find such an authority, either in religion or from an understanding of the natural world, and that the discovery that there is none leads one to feel ‘abandoned’. For existentialists such as Sartre, however, this sense of abandonment is only a prelude to the recognition that ethical values can be grounded from within a reflective understanding of the conditions under which individuals can attain *authenticity in their lives. Thus the conception of abandonment is essentially an existentialist dramatization of Kant’s rejection of heteronomous conceptions of value in favour of the autonomy of the good wil.
Find it here: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
The topic that was suggested, which I’m very happy to talk about, is “Democracy and Education.” The phrase democracy and education immediately brings to mind the life and work and thought of one of the outstanding thinkers of the past century, John Dewey, who devoted the greater part of his life and his thought to this array of issues. I guess I should confess a special interest. His thought was a strong influence on me in my formative years in fact, from about age two on, for a variety of reasons that I won’t go into but are real. For much of his life-later he was more skeptical-Dewey seems to have felt that reforms in early education could be in themselves a major lever of social change. They could lead the way to a more just and free society, a society in which, in his words, “the ultimate aim of production is not production of goods, but the production of free human beings associated with one another on terms of equality.” This basic commitment, which runs through all of Dewey’s work and thought, is profoundly at odds with the two lead-ing currents of modern social intellectual life; one, strong in his day-he was writing in the 1920s and 1930s about these things is associated with the command economies in Eastern Europe, the systems created by Lenin and Trotsky and turned into an even greater monstrosity by Stalin. The other, the state capitalist industrial society being constructed in the U.S. and much of the West, with the effective rule of private power. These two systems are similar in some fundamental ways, including ideologi-cally. Both were, and one of them remains, deeply authoritarian in fun-damental commitment, and both were very sharply and dramatically opposed to another tradition, the Left libertarian tradition, with roots in Enlightenment values, a tradition that included progressive liberals of the John Dewey variety, independent socialists like Bertrand Russell, lead-ing elements of the Marxist mainstream, mostly anti-Bolshevik, and of course libertarian socialists and various anarchist movements, not to speak of major parts of the labor movement and other popular sectors.
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Let me return to one of Dewey’s central themes, that the ultimate aim of production is not production of goods but the production of free human beings associated with one another on terms of equality. That includes, of course, education, which was a prime concern of his. The goal of education, to shift over to Bertrand Russell, is “to give a sense of the value of things other than domination,” to help create “wise citizens of a free community,” to encourage a combination of citizenship with liberty and individual creativeness, which means that we regard “a child as a gardener regards a young tree, as something with a certain intrinsic nature, which will develop into an admirable form, given proper soil and air and light.” In fact, much as they disagreed on many other things, as they did, Dewey and Russell did agree on what Russell called this “hu-manistic conception,” with its roots in the Enlightenment, the idea that education is not to be viewed as something like filling a vessel with wa-ter but, rather, assisting a flower to grow in its own way-an eighteenth-century view that they revived. In other words, providing the circum-stances in which the normal creative patterns will flourish.
Read the rest here: https://www.scribd.com/doc/177531554/Noam-Chomsky-On-Miseducation-pdf
330 Not enough! – It is not enough to prove something, one has also to seduce or elevate people to it. That is why the man of knowledge should learn how to speak his wisdom: and often in such a way that it sounds like folly!
342 Beware ofconfusion!– Yes! He considers the matter from all sides, and you think he is a genuine man of knowledge. But he only wants to lower the price – he wants to buy it
[1] (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.
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[51] (1) Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate cause. (2) Such work lies in the province of philosophy. (3) I shall confine myself to what concerns method – that is, to the character of fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing
ourselves therefrom. (4) Let us then first inquire into the nature of a fictitious idea.
[52] (1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. (2) Now “fiction” is chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. (3) I will, therefore, consider these first – I mean cases where only the existence of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or assumed to be understood. (4) For instance, I feign that Peter, whom I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, [r] or something of that kind. (5) With what is such an idea concerned? (6) It is concerned with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible.
[53] (1) I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we feign that it exists. (2) If the necessity or impossibility of its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it;
Read the rest here: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1016/1016-h/1016-h.htm
Nochrisis 