3 Because of a doubt peculiar to my own nature, which I am reluctant to confess—for it concerns itself with morality, with everything which up to the present has been celebrated on earth as morality—a doubt which came into my life so early, so uninvited, so irresistibly, in such contradiction to my surroundings, my age, the examples around me, and my origin, that I would almost have the right to call it my “a priori” [before experience]—because of this, my curiosity as well as my suspicions had to pause early on at the question about where our good and evil really originated. In fact, as a thirteen-yearold lad, my mind was already occupying itself with the problem of the origin of evil. At an age when one has “half childish play, half God in one’s heart,” I devoted my first childish literary trifle, my first written philosophical exercise, to this problem—and so far as my “solution” to it at that time is
16 There are still harmless self-observers who believe in the existence of “immediate certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Schopenhauer’s superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object here to seize, stark naked, as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took place from either the side of the subject or the side of the object. But I will say this a hundred times: “immediate certainty,” like “absolute knowledge” and the “thing in itself ” contains a contradictio in adjecto. For once and for all, we should free ourselves from the seduction of words! Let the people believe that knowing means knowing to the very end; the philosopher has to say: “When I dissect the process expressed in the proposition ‘I think,’ I get a whole set of bold claims that are difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish, – for instance, that I am the one who is thinking, that there must be something that is thinking in the first place, that thinking is an activity and the effect of a being who is considered the cause, that there is an ‘I,’ and finally, that it has already been determined what is meant by thinking, – that I know what thinking is. Because if I had not already made up my mind what thinking is, how could I tell whether what had just happened was not perhaps ‘willing’ or ‘feeling’? Enough: this ‘I think’ presupposes that I compare my present state with other states that I have seen in myself, in order to determine what it is: and because of this retrospective comparison with other types of ‘knowing,’ this present state has absolutely no ‘immediate certainty’ for me.” – In place of that “immediate certainty” which may, in this case, win the faith of the people, the philosopher gets handed a whole assortment of metaphysical questions, genuinely probing intellectual questions of conscience, such as: “Where do I get the concept of thinking from? Why do I believe in causes and effects? What gives me the right to speak about an I, and, for that matter, about an I as cause, and, finally, about an I as the cause of thoughts?” Whoever dares to answer these metaphysical questions right away with an appeal to a sort of intuitive knowledge, like the person who says: “I think and know that at least this is true, real, certain” – he will find the philosopher of today ready with a smile and two question-marks. “My dear sir,” the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, “it is improbable that you are not mistaken: but why insist on the truth?”
Sometimes you have to start at the beginning somewhere halfway
Friedrich Nietzsche
On the Genealogy of Morals
Preface
1 We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves, how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves? It has rightly been said: “Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also”; our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are. We are constantly making for them, being by nature winged creatures and honeygatherers of the spirit; there is one thing alone we really care about from the heart “bringing something home.” Whatever else there is in life, so-called experiences”-which of us has sufficient earnestness for them? Or sufficient time? Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us “absent-minded”: we cannot give our hearts to it-not even our ears! Rather, as one divinely preoccupied and immersed in himself into hose ear the bell has just boomed with all its strength the twelve beats of noon suddenly starts up and asks himself: “what really was that which just struck?” so we sometimes rub our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, “what really was that which we have just experienced?” and moreover: “who are we really?” and, afterward as aforesaid, count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being-and alas! miscount them. So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law “Each is furthest from himself · applies to aur eternity-we are not “men of knowledge” with respect to ourselves.
11 Popular morality and popular medicine. – The morality which prevails in a community is constantly being worked at by everybody: most people produce example after example of the alleged relationship between cause and effect, between guilt and punishment, confirm it as well founded and strengthen their faith: some observe actions and their consequences afresh and draw conclusions and laws from their observations: a very few take exception here and there and thus diminish faith on these points. – All, however, are at one in the wholly crude, unscientific character of their activity; whether it is a matter of producing examples, making observations or taking exception, whether it is a matter of proving, confirming, expressing or refuting a law – both material and form are worthless, as are the material and form of all popular medicine. Popular medicine and popular morality belong together and ought not to be evaluated so differently as they still are: both are the most dangerous pseudosciences.
25 (Spring-Fall 1887) On the genesis of the nihilist.- It is only late that one musters the courage for what one really knows.14 That I have hitherto been a thorough-going nihilist, I have admitted to myself only recently: the energy and radicalism with which I advanced as a nihilist deceived me about this basic fact. When one moves toward a goal it seems impossible that “goal-lessness as such” is the principle of our faith.
297 Do not wish to see prematurely. -As long as we are experiencing something, we must give ourselves over to the experience and close our eyes, and thus, while still in it, not make ourselves already the observer of it. That would, of course, disturb our good digestion of the experience; instead of a bit of wisdom, we would take away a bit of indigestion.
2 What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. This history can be related even now; for necessity itself is at work here. This future speaks even now in a hundred signs, this destiny announces itself everywhere; for this music of the future all ears are cocked even now. For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect.
163 After a great victory.– What is best about a great victory is that it liberates the victor from the fear of defeat. “Why not be defeated some time, too?., he says to himself; “Now I am rich enough for that..
166 Always in our company.- Whatever in nature and in history is of my own kind, speaks to me, spurs me on, and cormforts me; the rest I do not hear or forget right away. We are always only in our own company.
179 Thoughts.– Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings-always darker, emptier. and simpler.
Inspecting water pumps together with the head of the village, Cambodia 1993.
The following short aphorism from the book Human All Too Human has no hidden traps or meanings I just like the way it flows. You can read the original at the bottom, but the nice thing about the English language combined with the characters of the translators is that you can enjoy it in several forms and choose the one you like. Let me know which one you like the most. I personally prefer Hollingdale translations.
-488 Composure in action. – Just as a waterfall grows slower and more lightly suspended as it plunges down, so the great man of action usually acts with greater composure than the fierceness of his desires before he acted had led us to expect. (Translated by R. J. Hollingdale, 1986)
-488 Calm in action. As a waterfall becomes slower and more floating as it plunges, so the great man of action will act with greater calm than could be expected from his violent desire before the deed. (Translated by Marion Faber, 1984)
-488 Equanimity in action. -As a waterfall moves more slowly and floats more leisurely as it plunges downward, so a great man of action tends to act with more equanimity than his tempestuous desire prior to acting would have led us to expect. (Translated by Gary Handwerk, 1995)
488. Calmness in action.—As a cascade in its descent becomes more deliberate and suspended, so the great man of action usually acts with more calmness than his strong passions previous to action would lead one to expect. (Translated by Helen Zimmern, 1909)
-488 The calm indeed. — Just as a waterfall becomes slower and more floating as it falls, so the great man of deeds tends to act with more calmness, which is what his stormy desire before the deed led to expect. (Google translate, 2024)
-488 The calm indeed. Just as a waterfall becomes slower and more flowing as it falls, so the great man of deeds tends to act with more calmness, which is not what his stormy desire before the deed led to expect. (Translated by Chat GPT 3.5, 2024)
I told ChatGPT that it was the same translation as Googles translation, it apologized and gave me a new translation:
The tranquility, indeed. Just as a waterfall slows and becomes more graceful in its descent, similarly, the person of great deeds tends to act with more calmness, contrary to what his turbulent desire before the deed might have suggested. (Translated by Chat GPT 3.5, 2024)
Die Ruhe in der That. — Wie ein Wasserfall im Sturz langsamer und schwebender wird, so pflegt der grosse Mensch der That mit mehr Ruhe zu handeln, also seine stürmische Begierde vor der That es erwarten liess.
Two young soldiers on patrol with us, plus a road sign, our camp was in Ampil, Cambodia 1993
444 War. – Against war it can be said: it makes the victor stupid, the defeated malicious. In favour of war: through producing these two effects it barbarizes and therefore makes more natural; it is the winter or hibernation time of culture, mankind emerges from it stronger for good and evil. From Human All Too Human
This aphorism is more self-explanatory. I don’t know if Nietzsche celebrates the act of war; he was a medic in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, but I don’t know if he was confronted by the violence of war or only by the result of exploding bombshells. Most people who knew Nietzsche say that he was a friendly man, kind and polite. Not the typical war monger or brut you might think of when reading some of his works. I think that war was, for Nietzsche, more of an abstraction than the gruesome reality it is. There have always been periods through history where society suddenly takes a few steps forward, and this might often seem to happen after a war, but it is hard to unravel what happens in a society, especially when something as gruesome as a war is going on. I know that for many people, war is still something to celebrate, probably for other reasons than Nietzsche does, but for me, raised at the end of the Cold War by a passivist mother, war is something you want to avoid.
I think that Nietzsche is more right when he says: it makes the victor stupid, the defeated malicious, but that is also more of an open door. He also says that war barbarizes and therefore makes more natural. I am not sure what he wants to say, but nature is, of course, barbarous, with no morals or thoughts of the future and past to guide it. He goes on to say: it is the winter or hibernation time of culture, mankind emerges from it stronger for good and evil. Again, I don’t think that during a war, progression stops or hibernates, as he implies*. He ends with the idea that we get stronger out of it, as I discussed earlier, but the last words are for good and evil, so maybe he balances it out again, and has he merely put us on the wrong foot when we read this aphorism. As if we reacted with our own “barbarous” mind. With Nietzsche, you never know
*I just started reading Victor Frankl’s book Man’s Search for Meaning, A book that originates in the Nazzi death camps, and it has helped society to move forward in several ways. No hibernation in the epicenter of that war.
6o To desire to revenge and then to carry out revenge means to be the victim of a vehement attack of fever which then, however, passes: but to desire to revenge without possessing the strength and courage to carry out revenge means to carry about a chronic illness, a poisoning of body and soul. Morality, which looks only at intentions, assesses both cases equally; in the ordinary way the former case is assessed as being the worse (on account of the evil consequences which the act of revenge will perhaps produce). Both evaluations are short sighted. From Human All Too Human
Reading philosophy can be challenging. Reading Nietzsche can be challenging, too. There are many reasons why I read a lot of Nietzsche. First of all, he just spoke to me; it’s like we enjoy the same music and stick with each other to enjoy it; there is no higher philosophical reason for it. I didn’t know anything about philosophy when I started reading it, so I could not be attracted to anyone’s philosophy. One thing that I still appreciate is that Nietzsche, for the most part, asks questions through all kinds of answers. He is not trying to tell you how the world works through elaborate systems spanning hundreds of pages. He writes aphorisms from one sentence to a couple of pages that are all loosely connected with the ones before and after. You can read his books from beginning to end but you can also open one and just read one of the aphorisms and think about it.
Interpretation
Italic = Nietzsche’s text Bolt = my interpretation and rewording
To desire to revenge and then to carry out revenge means to be the victim of a vehement attack of fever which then, however, passes: but to desire to revenge without possessing the strength and courage to carry out revenge means to carry about a chronic illness, a poisoning of body and soul. If you act directly on the urge to take revenge, that feeling that comes over you and clouds your judgment like a fever does, you will be freed of that feeling to take revenge. If you don’t act on that urge but take it with you, it might consume you from the inside out. Morality, which looks only at intentions, assesses both cases equally; Morality for Nietzsche is often closely related to Christianity and, in this case, the thought of revenge or the act of revenge is the same for an all-knowing God. in the ordinary way the former case is assessed as being the worse (on account of the evil consequences which the act of revenge will perhaps produce). The ordinary way is how secular society judges you, and acting on an urge is worse than not acting on it. Both evaluations are short sighted. And like Nietzsche tends to do, he throws a spanner in the works and forces you to think. The moralistic view is short sighted because of the judgment of an urge but the “ordinary way” because of the outcome of acting on that urge? In this case, it might help to read the aphorism before this one because, at this moment (late in the evening after a day’s work outside), I don’t see the other cause where the “short sighted(nes)” alludes to. Maybe he wants to tell us that it is, in both cases, a disease that makes us feel like taking revenge, or better said, we don’t choose to feel what we feel, and we don’t choose how we react; we react. Our circumstances determine how we react; there is no I that acts.
Several notes from Nietzsche written in 1987 are to be found in the book The Will to Power, a collection of his notes published after his death and not meant for publication.
Friedrich Nietzsche
The Will to Power
Book One: European Nihilism
What does nihilism mean? That the highest values evaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; “why?” finds no answer.
The supreme values in whose service man should live, especially when they were very hard on him and exacted a high price – these social values were erected over man to strengthen their voice, as if they were commands of God, as “reality,” as the “true” world, as a hope and future world. Now that the shabby origin of these values is becoming clear, the universe seems to have lost value, seems “meaningless”-but that is only a transitional stage.
Values and their changes are related to increases in the power of those positing the values. The measure of unbelief, of permitted “freedom of the spirit” as an expression of an increase in power. “Nihilism” an ideal of the highest degree of powerfulness of the spirit, the over-richest life-partly destructive, partly ironic.
23. Whether the Adherents of the Doctrine of Free Will have a Right to Punish?—Men whose vocation it is to judge and punish try to establish in every case whether an evil-doer is really responsible for his act, whether he was able to apply his reasoning powers, whether he acted with motives and not unconsciously or under constraint. If he is punished, it is because he preferred the worse to the better motives, which he must consequently have known. Where this knowledge is wanting, man is, according to the prevailing view, not responsible—unless his ignorance, e.g. his ignorantia legis, be the consequence of an intentional neglect to learn what he ought: in that case he already preferred the worse to the better motives at the time when he refused to learn, and must now pay the penalty of his unwise choice. If, on the other hand, perhaps through stupidity or shortsightedness, he has never seen the better motives, he is generally not punished, for people say that he made a wrong choice, he acted like a brute beast. The intentional rejection of the better reason is now needed before we treat the offender as fit to be punished.
Book III: Principle of a New Determination of Values/Part 1. The Will to Power as Knowledge
473 The intellect cannot criticize itself, precisely because it cannot be compared with different kinds of intellects, and because its ability to acquire knowledge would be manifested only in the face of ‘true reality’; i.e. in order to criticize the intellect, we should have to be superior beings who possessed ‘absolute knowledge’. This already presupposes that, apart from all perspectival kinds of observation and sensory and intellectual appropriation, there is something, an ‘in-itself’ – but the psychological derivation of the belief in things forbids our speaking of ‘things in themselves’.
38 There has recently been a great deal of idle talk using a loose and altogether inapplicable term: pessimism. Everywhere the talk is about pessimism, and everywhere people (occasionally even sensible people!) are wrangling over a specific question which they think admits of an answer: whether optimism or pessimism is correct. What they do not understand, although it is palpable, is that pessimism is not a problem but a symptom, that the term should be replaced by nihilism, that the question of whether it is better to be or not to be, is itself an illness, a decline in strength, a kind of hypersensitivity. The pessimistic movement is only an expression of physiological décadence . . .
302 (Nov. 1887-March 1888) If only human values would be put back once and for all into the places in which alone they belong: as loafers’ values. Many species of animals have already vanished; if man too should vanish nothing would be lacking in the world. One must be sufficient of a philosopher to admire this nothing, too (-Nil admirari)*
303 (Spring 1888) Man a little, eccentric species of animal, which-fortunately -has its day; all on earth a mere moment, an incident, an exception without consequences, something of no importance to the general character of the earth; the earth itself, like every star, a hiatus between two nothingnesses, an event without plan, reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of necessity, stupid necessity- Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity says to us: “all that must be false, for it arouses indignation could all that not be merely appearance? And man, in spite of all, as Kant says-“
*Admire nothing-usually quoted in the sense of “wonder at nothing (from Horace, Epistles, I.6.1.).
Nochrisis 