Day 3689, will to be free.

This is what I was thinking this morning.

I don’t believe in free will because I don’t believe we have a fixed “I” or soul. The I that I think of is more of a snapshot in an ever-changing row of identities. If I think or talk about who I am, I will change that story over time without realizing it. We forget how we identified ourselves in the past, making it seem as if our identity is a constant. You could say that decisions of my earlier me’s influence who I am now. I did not make those decisions; earlier circumstances and versions of me did. That’s one of the reasons I don’t believe in free will.

I do feel that I have a core that stays the same, but I also realize I have no independent way to check this. We all know that we change over time; no one will deny that. But that kind of change is more like what you go through at school, where you take classes and learn things. The things you learn add to who you are. But underneath these life lessons, so to speak, we also feel a more constant identity. We also know that a big part of this identity is located in the brain; change the brain, and your identity changes. Phineas Gage (https://www.verywellmind.com/phineas-gage-2795244) is the obvious example: whether he fully understood the change himself is less important than the fact that people around him did. Like everything in our bodies, our brains also deteriorate over time, and with them, perhaps our identities.

Our identity is constantly changing, and we might be lucky to hold onto the same identity for a few weeks before events alter our perception of our past and present us, the you that is in the making, with a new identity.

Many other thinkers have written about this idea. The way I wrote it down just now might be unique, but I can trace the path back into my past to see who influenced me and shaped my thoughts. Hume is one of those who have influenced me, not so much by the work I read from him but by the place he has in Philosophy. I have a book from him, and though I have had it for 20 years, it still looks brand new, though I found one of my bookmarks at page 92. I just tell myself that the mere presence of these kinds of books in my house rubs off on me. In reality, I used them to verify quotes because you should never trust a source to guarantee a quote’s accuracy.

I used my AI helper to point me in the right direction for finding a quote in Hume’s work about what I was writing about. It pointed me to this chapter, and though it quoted the passage incorrectly, the whole chapter is about an idea similar to what I thought of this morning. In my experience, the AI is almost always bad at quoting, and it tells so much itself. As I said before, you should always go to the source. On the other hand, the AI quote was not wrong; it still portrayed Hume’s intention, and like the modern “translation” into today’s English, they both differ substantially from the original in the words they use. Underneath the text, I will put two screenshots.

Quotes from Davi Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI (“Of personal identity”). Underneath, you can read three quotes from this book. The first quote is a modern translation, and the other is a reprint of the original text.

Some philosophers believe this: We are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; we feel its existence and its continuing to exist, and are certain—more even than any demonstration could make us—both of its perfect identity and of its simplicity. The strongest sensations and most violent emotions, instead of distracting us from this view ·of our self·, only focus it all the more intensely, making us think about how these sensations and emotions affect our self by bringing it pain or pleasure. To offer further evidence of the existence of one’s self would make it less evident, not more, because no fact we could use as evidence is as intimately present to our consciousness as is the existence of our self. If we doubt the latter, we can’t be certain of anything.

Unfortunately, all these forthright assertions are in conflict with the very experience that is supposed to support them. We don’t so much as have an idea of self of the kind that is here described. From what impression could this idea be derived? This question can’t be answered without obvious contradiction and absurdity; yet it must be answered if the idea of self is to qualify as clear and intelligible. (Modern translation by Jonathan Bennett, 2004: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hume1739book1.pdf page 130)

There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. The strongest sensation, the most violent passion, say they, instead of distracting us from this view, only fix it the more intensely, and make us consider their influence on self either by their pain or pleasure. To attempt a farther proof of this were to weaken its evidence ; since no proof can be derived from any fact, of which we are so intimately conscious ; nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this.

Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. For from what impression cou’d this idea be derived? This question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity; and yet ’tis a question, which must necessarily be answer’d, if we wou’d have the idea of self pass for clear and intelligible. (original: https://archive.org/details/treatiseofhumann002393mbp/page/250/mode/2up)

What, then, makes us so inclined to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose that we have an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives? To answer this question, we must distinguish what we think and imagine about personal identity from the role of personal identity in our emotions and desires. The former is our present subject… (Modern translation, page 131)

What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives ? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject… (original: https://archive.org/details/treatiseofhumann002393mbp/page/252/mode/2up)

Memory should be regarded as the source of personal identity, mainly because without it we wouldn’t know of the existence of this lengthy and continuous sequence of perceptions. If we had no memory, we would never have any notion of causation or, consequently, of the chain of causes and effects that constitute our self or person. Once we have acquired this notion of causation from our memory…(Modern translation, Pag 136)

As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, ’tis to be consider’d, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou’d have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of causation from the memory… (original: https://archive.org/details/treatiseofhumann002393mbp/page/262/mode/2up)

Summary of A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section VI by LeChat

Hume’s Argument on Personal Identity:

Hume challenges the common belief that we have a fixed, unchanging self. He argues that when we introspect, we don’t find a single, permanent “self” but rather a succession of fleeting perceptions—sensations, emotions, thoughts—that are constantly changing. There is no impression or idea of a “self” that remains the same over time, because all our perceptions are distinct, separable, and in perpetual flux.

He compares the mind to a “stage” where perceptions appear, pass, and mingle in endless variety. There is no simplicity or identity to the mind at any given moment, nor across time. The illusion of a continuous self arises because the mind smoothly transitions between related perceptions (through resemblance, contiguity, or causation), mistaking this fluid sequence for a single, unchanging entity.

Hume concludes that personal identity is a fiction—a mental habit of associating perceptions so closely that we imagine them as part of a unified, enduring self. This fiction is useful for everyday life but is not grounded in reality. Identity, for Hume, is not a metaphysical fact but a psychological construct created by the imagination to make sense of our ever-changing experiences.

Key Points:

The self is not a fixed entity but a bundle of perceptions in constant flux.
The mind constructs the illusion of continuity by smoothly transitioning between related perceptions.
Personal identity is a fiction created by the imagination, not an observable reality.

David Hume (7 May 1711 – 25 August 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist and essayist who is known for his highly influential system of empiricism, philosophical scepticism and metaphysical naturalism. Beginning with A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), Hume strove to create a naturalistic science of man that examined the psychological basis of human nature. Hume followed John Locke in rejecting the existence of innate ideas, concluding that all human knowledge derives solely from experience; this places him amongst such empiricists as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Locke and George Berkeley.

Hume argued that inductive reasoning and belief in causality cannot be justified empirically; instead, they result from custom and mental habit. People never actually perceive that one event causes another but experience only the “constant conjunction” of events. This problem of induction means that to draw any causal inferences from past experience, it is necessary to presuppose that the future will resemble the past; this metaphysical presupposition cannot itself be grounded in prior experience.

An opponent of philosophical rationalists, Hume held that passions rather than reason govern human behaviour, proclaiming that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”Hume was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on emotion or sentiment rather than abstract moral principle. He maintained an early commitment to naturalistic explanations of moral phenomena and is usually accepted by historians of European philosophy to have first clearly expounded the is–ought problem, or the idea that a statement of fact alone can never give rise to a normative conclusion of what ought to be done.

Hume denied that people have an actual conception of the self, positing that they experience only a bundle of sensations and that the self is nothing more than this bundle of perceptions connected by an association of ideas. Hume’s compatibilist theory of free will takes causal determinism as fully compatible with human freedom. His philosophy of religion, including his rejection of miracles and critique of the argument from design, was especially controversial. Hume left a legacy that affected utilitarianism, logical positivism, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive science, theology and many other fields and thinkers. Immanuel Kant credited Hume as the inspiration that had awakened him from his “dogmatic slumbers”. (Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume)