The Epistemic Basing Relation
The epistemic basing relation is the relation which holds between a reason and a belief if and only if the reason is a reason for which the belief is held. It is generally thought to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a belief’s being justified that the belief be based on a reason. The basing relation is what distinguishes good reasons which a person possesses that contribute to the personal justification of a given belief from good reasons which the person possesses but that do not contribute to the personal justification of the belief.
Basing relations may be involved in both inferential and non-inferential justification. For example, one may hold that sensory states count as reasons, and thus require that a sensory belief be based on a reason if it is to be justified by that reason. In addition, one might understand at least some self-evident beliefs to be based on the meanings of the various terms of the sentence expressing the proposition believed. For example, one’s belief that all bachelors are unmarried men may be understood to be based on the meanings of ‘all’, ‘bachelors’, ‘are’, etc.
The basing relation is most frequently analyzed in terms of a reason’s causing a belief.[1] In such analyses, the reason and the belief are understood to be mental states of a person. The cause may be a contributing cause or a sufficient cause. However, the basing relation has also been analyzed as an appropriate counterfactual cause of a belief and also as depending on an appropriate meta-belief to the effect that a reason is a good reason to hold the belief.
Analysis of the basing relation is relevant to a variety of fundamental epistemological issues. It is relevant to the nature of epistemic rationalization and to questions regarding the internalism/externalism debate. In addition, it has been argued that reliabilist theories of justification are incompatible with the correct analysis of the basing relation.
Read the rest here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/basing-epistemic/
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The epistemic basing relation concerns the connection between a person’s belief and the reason or evidence on which that belief is based. It addresses a specific question: when does a belief count as being held because of a particular piece of evidence?
This issue arises in theories of knowledge that require not only that a belief be true and justified, but that it be appropriately grounded in the justification. It is not enough that you have good evidence and happen to believe something true. The belief must be based on that evidence in the right way.
Consider a simple case. You see dark clouds and believe it will rain. Here the perceptual experience appears to be what your belief is based on. Now compare that with a case where you see the same clouds, but your belief that it will rain is actually based on a superstition about the date. Even if the clouds are good evidence, the belief is not based on them. The epistemic basing relation distinguishes these cases.
Philosophers disagree about how to analyze this relation. There are several main approaches:
First, causal theories. On this view, a belief is based on evidence if the evidence causally produces the belief in the right way. The relation is a causal one. However, simple causal accounts face problems. A belief might be causally influenced by evidence without being rationally grounded in it.
Second, doxastic or psychological accounts. These emphasize the subject’s internal mental states. A belief is based on evidence when the person treats that evidence as a reason—when it figures in their reasoning or deliberation. This approach stresses the role of rational agency rather than mere causation.
Third, counterfactual accounts. These say that a belief is based on evidence if, had the subject not had that evidence, they would not have held the belief (or would have held it less firmly). These accounts attempt to capture dependence without reducing everything to direct causation.
The basing relation is important because it connects justification to knowledge. Many epistemologists argue that knowledge requires not only justification but proper basing. A true belief supported by good reasons does not qualify as knowledge if the belief is not actually grounded in those reasons.
In short, the epistemic basing relation explains what it means for a belief to be held on the basis of evidence. It clarifies the difference between having reasons and believing for those reasons.
Nochrisis 