Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics
Suppose that you have been invited to attend an ex-partner’s wedding and that the best thing you can do is accept the invitation and be pleasant at the wedding. But, suppose furthermore that if you do accept the invitation, you’ll freely decide to get inebriated at the wedding and ruin it for everyone, which would be the worst outcome. The second best thing to do would be to simply decline the invitation. In light of these facts, should you accept or decline the invitation? (Zimmerman 2006: 153). The answer to this question hinges on the actualism/possibilism debate in ethics, which concerns the relationship between an agent’s free actions and her moral obligations. In particular, it focuses on whether facts about how an agent would freely act in certain contexts play any role in determining the agent’s moral obligations. Historically, the debate has primarily arisen in the work of impartial consequentialists with an interest in deontic logic. However, its relevance is not limited to such versions of consequentialism. The debate concerns the scope of acts that are relevant options for the agent, which is an issue that cuts across, and has substantive implications for, a wide range of normative ethical views. As such, the debate brings into focus issues of central importance for any normative ethical theory.
Read the rest here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/
The AI thinks this:
In ethics, actualism and possibilism disagree about how an agent’s obligations depend on what the agent would do versus what the agent could do.
Actualism:
What you ought to do depends on what you would actually do in the relevant circumstances, given your character, motivations, and likely failures. If choosing an option would predictably lead you to act badly later, then you ought not to choose it, even if there exists a better possible course you could have taken afterward.
Standard intuition:
If you know that accepting a responsibility will lead you to neglect it later, then you ought not to accept it, even if there is a possible world in which you would follow through perfectly.
Actualism is agent-relative and psychologically realistic. It ties obligation to expected behavior, not idealized capacity.
Possibilism:
What you ought to do depends on what you could do, not on what you would in fact do. If there is a possible sequence of actions available to you that leads to the best outcome, then you ought to take the first step, even if you know you probably won’t complete the sequence.
Standard intuition:
You ought to choose the option that allows for the best possible outcome, regardless of your predicted weakness or failure.
Possibilism treats moral obligation as independent of your likely noncompliance. It is more demanding and more idealized.
Core contrast in one sentence:
Actualism asks, “Given what you will actually do, what should you do now?”
Possibilism asks, “Given what you could do, what should you do now?”
Why it matters:
The debate affects questions about moral demandingness, responsibility, weakness of will, and moral advice. Actualism fits better with guidance and blame; possibilism fits better with moral ideals and impartial evaluation.
Econlib
Actualism, Possibilism, and Public Choice
Among the many things about which philosophers disagree, one of the debates I find interesting is the debate between actualists and possibilists. Roughly, possibilists believe you should engage in the best possible action you could, whereas actualists think you should do the best thing you will actually do given your imperfections, even if it’s technically possible for you to do better. To try to see the disagreement play out, consider this scenario.
I’m engaged in a tennis match with Bob, and Bob handily beats me. I’m a hothead with a terrible temper, and I really want to smack Bob over the head with my tennis racquet, but of course that would be bad to do. Let’s say there are three possible ways things can go.
In the best scenario, I approach the net, shake hands with Bob and congratulate him on a good game like a good sport. A less than ideal scenario is that I storm off the tennis court in a huff. And the worst case scenario is that I go over to Bob and whack him over the head with my tennis racquet. Let’s say that I know myself and my temper well enough to be sure that if I go near Bob right now, I will give in to my anger and whack him over the head. It’s metaphysically possible for me to not do this, but in practice this is what I will in fact do. Should I approach the net?
The possibilist would say that since the best thing I could possibly do would be to walk up to the net and shake hands like a good sport, I should approach the net. The actualist says that, given the facts of my personality and weakness, the best thing I will actually do is walk off the court in a huff, so I should not approach the net.
By: Kevin Cocora, https://www.econlib.org/actualism-possibilism-and-public-choice/
Cambridge University Press
Probabilism: An Open Future Solution to the Actualism/Possibilism Debate
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent’s present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom requires a metaphysically open future. We develop probabilism as a solution to the actualism/possibilism debate, a solution that accommodates an open future requirement for freedom. We argue that probabilism resolves the conflicting intuitions that arise between actualists and possibilists and maintains certain distinct advantages over actualism and possibilism.
By: Yishai Cohen and Travis Timmerman, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/probabilism-an-open-future-solution-to-the-actualismpossibilism-debate/C46C031B6693B74A48199C5C23AA6182
Nochrisis 